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Introduction. Studies in Disconnection:  















“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme—and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments—it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms—the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases—of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword-based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
viii there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines—from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature—are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term—to begin with: 
communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, machine, 
archives, organize, action at a distance—diverge and converge in 
surprising ways. By pairing up scholars from North America and 
Europe, this series also advances media theory by obviating the 
proverbial “ten year gap” that exists across language barriers due 
to the vagaries of translation and local academic customs and in 
order to provoke new descriptions, prescriptions, and hypothe-






There is a certain sense of strangeness to write the introduction to 
a book on undoing networks in voluntary self- isolation.1 The once 
open and connected world is suddenly disconnected and physically 
more separated than ever before. National borders are being 
closed, international travel is banned, people are encouraged— or 
sometimes forced with the threat of a fine— to seek shelter or stay 
home, employers are moving work to internet platforms to avoid 
physical meetings, and many universities around the world have 
transitioned from teaching in- person classes to online environ-
ments. The cause of this situation in the spring of 2020, as might 
go without saying, is the outbreak of the coronavirus COVID- 19, 
whose symptoms include dry cough, shortness of breath, fever, 
and even deathly pneumonia.2 While the mortality rate estimates 
differ from source to source and country to country, emergency 
measures are being put in place at local, regional, national, and 
global scales to help healthcare systems cope with the outbreak. 
First identified in the Wuhan area of China in December 2019, the 
novel coronavirus quickly went global. To anyone for whom virality 
had become associated with social media and a certain business 
logic where “money” follows “social influence as it spreads across a 
x network” (Sampson 2012, 2), COVID- 19 provides a timely reminder 
about the epidemiological traces of virality. The rapid spread of the 
virus shows that networks, whether physical or virtual, can give rise 
to an uncontrolled, wild, and even destructive form of connectivity. 
“[N]etworks,” as Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker (2007, 6) 
point out, sometimes “carry with them the most nonhuman and 
misanthropic tendencies.” By March 11, COVID-19 was recognized 
as a pandemic by the World Health Organization. Due to the 
rapid spread of the virus, disconnection, evasion, isolation, and 
avoidance became the new social norm, and online connections 
the preferred mode of social interaction. While we may be done 
with physical networking (at least for a while), we are not done 
with networks. In fact, as a form of “biological network,” “emerging 
infectious diseases . . . are highly dependent on one or more net-
works” (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 90). The virus spreads within 
networks, and network models are used to explain how COVID- 19 
becomes contagious; epidemiology and machine learning attempt 
to model and anticipate its movements. If virality thrives within 
networks, predicting the edges and cutting the nodes can be a way 
to bring it under control.
The control of networks and our personal connectivity with them 
has been one of the key topics of the recent scholarly discussion 
on the practices and theories of disconnection. The emergence 
of this nascent field we call here disconnection studies is conjoined 
with the rise of social media and other technological platforms of 
networked connectivity that have normalized the digital (Kuntsman 
and Miyake 2019, 902). The “intensification of attention economy,” 
the political push toward digitalization of societies and their 
services, together with trends like self- optimization have been 
discussed as reasons individuals begin to challenge the premises of 
ubiquitous connectivity (Syvertsen 2020, 7– 8). Studies of disconnec-
tion pay attention to users’ practices of resistance against partic-
ular digital platforms (Light 2014; Brennen 2019) but also criticize, 
for example, the principles of digital capitalism and exploitative 
data practices underlying the existing social network models 
xi(Bucher 2020; Natale and Treré 2020; Karppi 2018). The vectors of 
disconnection studies constitute different methodological practices 
dedicated to exploring the individual and collective tactics and 
strategies of living with networks from empirical research to  
media art and research creation, and find inspiration in the media- 
theoretical underpinnings of failures, breaks, disruptions, and 
states of exception.
Disconnection studies approach notions such as connectivity and 
practices like networking from a direction where the interest is 
not in the unity they create but quite on the contrary. “The word 
‘disconnection’ is a verb and implies the removal or breaking a 
connection,” writes Ben Light (2014, 150) in the first book- length 
study of online disconnection. Breaks, disruptions, and removals 
turn our attention to the meaning of making connections and the 
significance of connectivity (Sundén and Blagojević 2019, 57), as 
well as to the fact that disconnection cannot exist without con-
nections (Hesselberth 2018). The flipside of Pepita Hesselberth’s 
“paradox of disconnection” is of course also true: there is no 
connection without the potentiality of disconnection (Hesselberth 
2018; Light and Cassidy 2014). Connections are always fragile and 
need to be sustained, maintained, and managed (Strathern 1996, 
523; Karppi 2018).
As Gilles Deleuze (1989, 280) famously defined, theory is “a practice 
of concepts” that interferes with other concepts coming from 
different practices. The studies of disconnection come with an 
arsenal of different concepts such as unplugging, unfriending, and 
withdrawal; these studies unpack devices like Faraday cages, dwell 
into meetings that take place in detox camps, examine practices of 
digital minimalism, and ask if digital suicide can really end the life 
of a data double (for the discussion of these notions see chapter 4). 
In this book, the concept of undoing provides the optics for looking 
at disconnection. As part of the disconnection vocabulary, undoing 
is a notion that highlights activity. In his book on radical empiri-
cism, William James (1912, 161) writes that “any apprehension of 
something doing, is an experience of activity.” For James, doing is 
xii a form of bare activity and “the sense of ‘life’” is constituted by the 
experience of changes taking place (James 1912, 161). Something 
doing indicates activity, and without activity there is nothing 
(Massumi 2011, 1). Erin Manning (2015, 55) argues that “when 
something does, new relational fields are forming, and with them, 
new modes of existence.” Undoing is not the negation of doing but 
a more specified activity where the change taking place is often 
evoked as resistance (Deutsch 2007, 122). The dictionary definition 
of “undo,” for example, is to untie, unfasten, or loosen, and it can 
indicate a process of canceling or reversing results. Undoing uses 
the power of what Karen Barad (2007, 175) has called an “agential 
cut”— a temporal separation that reconfigures parts in an assem-
blage. The impacts of undoing range from responsive to critical and 
even to the extreme of destructive.
The project of this book is to examine and even draw such cuts, 
to undo what different connections and network models are 
doing to our experiences, and to ask how networks appear when 
approached from angles that challenge and reverse the consti-
tutive order of the past two decades: to connect. The intention of 
the following passages of this introductory essay is to think some 
of the core ideas of disconnection studies by reflecting what the 
COVID- 19 has done to our tendencies to connect. As pointed out 
by Adi Kuntsman and Esperanza Miyake (2018, 903– 4), studies of 
digital disengagement too often conflate the social with the digital. 
The pandemic forces us to revise and undo some of the ties that 
bind these two notions together.
Let us thus begin in medias res, by mapping the specificities of this 
situation as it is unfolding in spring 2020. First of all, the pan-
demic makes clear that disconnection is not an exclusively online 
phenomenon (Light 2014; see chapter 1 in this book). Since the 
virus spreads through any physical network consisting of humans, 
the only way to slow it down and prevent it from affecting at- risk 
populations is to cut off all physical contact. Children are not sup-
posed to meet their grandparents; the sick are supposed to remain 
indoors. Practices like quarantine and self- isolation disrupt our 
xiiidaily practices and force us to determine which connections are 
really necessary, which may be disregarded, and which should be 
avoided completely. “Connection and disconnection are dynamic 
processes that are constantly under re- negotiation,” as Anne Kaun 
and Christian Schwarzenegger (2014) argue.
Studying disconnection means exploring and theorizing how to 
think both with and beyond the dominant imaginaries of connec-
tivity. If connectivity is about putting things to work by mobilizing 
the “forms, dynamics, and spatial parameter of operations,” then 
disconnection is expressed in the forms of “stillness, waiting, and 
de- intensification” (Tellmann, Opitz, and Stäheli 2012, 210– 11). 
When networks fail, we are left balancing between a sense of “help-
lessness and the desire for control” (Paasonen 2014, 703). In April 
2020, many basic services have been reduced, air travel is possible 
only in special circumstances, no one knows when daycares and 
schools will reopen. Goods still move but people remain in place. 
The virus has driven financial markets into a state of crisis. We can 
only wait in this disconnected state.
We are all in this together, as politicians, the press, and experts 
declare, but our positions are hardly equal. Disconnection studies 
raise questions about the capital, labor, and knowledge needed to 
withdraw. While networking has long been a central skill in many 
professions, only the introvert seems to thrive in social isolation 
(see chapter 1 in this book). The ability to disconnect demands 
social capital in the form of networks that exist outside social 
media (Portwood- Stacer 2013), particular skills (Syvertsen 2018), 
knowledge (Kaun and Treré 2018), and is sometimes a luxury 
of the few and reflective of their positions of power (Karppi and 
Nieborg 2020).
In the pandemic, working from home is encouraged, though not 
everyone has this privilege. Among the first to feel the impact of 
the recession were the airlines, whose job had been to connect 
people, countries, and continents. Essential workers, such as 
health care workers and first responders, cannot work from home. 
xiv “Long- standing systemic health and social inequities have put some 
members of racial and ethnic minority groups at increased risk of 
getting COVID- 19 or experiencing severe illness, regardless of age,” 
research by Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (2020) in the 
United States shows. People with lower income and for example 
new immigrants are being affected by the pandemic more adverse-
ly (CBC News 2020). Those whose income depends on the new gig 
economy cannot withdraw; they keep bringing food and goods to 
people who order them online from the relative safety of isolation.
In the virus era, whether biological or computer- based, everyone 
is made responsible for not only keeping themselves safe but 
also ensuring the safety of others (Parikka 2007). Practices of 
disconnection render self- regulation visible and make it normative 
(Jorge 2019). A prime example of the new normal associated with 
disconnection is the practice of “social distancing.” “Put simply,” 
the New York Times explains, “the idea is to maintain a distance 
between you and other people— in this case, at least six feet. 
That also means minimizing contact with people. Avoid public 
transportation whenever possible, limit nonessential travel, work 
from home and skip social gatherings— and definitely do not go to 
crowded bars and sporting arenas” (Mandavilli 2020). A sign on the 
gate of a closed public park in Toronto, Canada, declares: “Practice 
good physical distancing— two metres apart or about the length of 
a hockey stick.” Keeping the distance of a hockey stick protects peo-
ple, because COVID- 19 spreads via respiratory droplets produced 
from coughing or sneezing. The practice of social distancing has  
become one of the key symbols of the preventive measures 
governments, organizations, and individuals are taking against the 
threat of COVID- 19 infection. Other symbols include face masks 
(see also chapter 2 on privacy wear), hand sanitizers, and toilet 
paper, which quickly sold out or moved to the black market. People 
in masks now appear everywhere in public— in airports, schools, 
parks, and restaurants— if they are not closed already.
Social distancing, self- isolation, quarantine, and states of exception 
have only intensified what Gilles Deleuze once defined as the 
xvold modes of control, associating them with Michel Foucault’s 
notion of disciplinary mechanisms. We are witnessing the revival 
of techniques of enclosure that are based on spatial partitioning 
and physically separating people from each other (Deleuze 1992; 
Foucault 1979, 195– 200). Different guidelines continue to be imple-
mented by nation- states in order to “flatten the curve” and ensure 
that each of their own health care systems can manage its patients. 
To slow down the spread of the virus, anyone who has been in 
touch with an infected individual or has traveled in high- risk areas 
is asked or forced to self- isolate for fourteen days. Those who 
exhibit signs of infection are placed in quarantine.
Disconnection constitutes not only a break but “also a state in 
which something can exist in” (Light 2014, 150). Social distancing, 
quarantine, and self- isolation all protect us from the virus. Among 
other countries, Finland declared a state of emergency, which 
granted juridical rights to limit the size of any meetings— first to no 
more than five hundred and soon to no more than ten participants. 
New rules and restrictions go into effect every day. Restaurants 
offer only takeout. Gyms, hairdressers, beaches, and many other 
public spaces are forced to close indefinitely. Being “corona free” 
is now a selling point on Tinder. Individuals are voluntarily carving 
out their own isolated zones where new social norms apply: no 
hugging, no touching, no forms of physical contact. In the pandem-
ic, life itself is being protected by disconnection.
Nation- states try different tactics to control the pandemic, from 
nudging the citizens’ social behavior toward more socially distant 
interactions to closing the borders to noncitizens (see also chapter 3 
on nudging). One critic of the exceptional measures taken by certain 
nation- states is Giorgio Agamben (2020a; 2020b). In response, 
Jean- Luc Nancy points out that “exception” is not an anomaly but is 
“becoming the rule in a world where technical interconnections of all 
kinds (movement, transfers of every type, impregnation or spread 
of substances, and so on) are reaching a hitherto unknown intensity 
that is growing at the same rate as the population,” and the role of 
the government is just one small piece of the puzzle (Nancy 2020).
xvi When Foucault wrote about the exceptional measures taken to 
control the plague at the end of the seventeenth century, by sepa-
rating contaminated spaces and people from those perceived to be 
healthy, he also highlighted the role of practices such as classifying, 
registering, and reporting that emerged alongside (Foucault 1979, 
196– 97). Virus discourses, both biological and computational, that 
focus on the threats and vulnerabilities subsisting in connection 
seem inseparable from the practices that shaped the network 
culture in the 1990s (Parikka 2007, 94– 96; McKinney and Mulvin 
2019). Similarly, the responses to Covid- 19 are accompanied by 
a development of new digital practices designed to control the 
risk of contamination. Mark Andrejevic and Neil Selwyn describe 
“how smartphones can be repurposed as monitoring systems to 
support the management and control of the public,” for instance, 
by forcing everyone to download an app that lets individuals know 
whether they can leave their apartments (Andrejevic and Selwyn 
2020). In Germany, Deutsche Telekom is giving out smartphone 
location data for tracking the movements of the general public and 
making predictions about the spread of the virus (Schaer 2020). In 
May, Apple and Google introduced an automated “contact tracing” 
system where smartphones via Bluetooth connect automatically 
with other phones in proximity.3 The recorded information about 
the time and space of contact can then be used to warn the owners 
of the possible exposure to the virus. If social networks were 
based on establishing digital connections for users to stay in touch 
with their existing networks of friends, colleagues, or people they 
share interests with, regardless of their physical time and location, 
COVID- 19 brings forward its reverse image. In the new world, the 
social is determined by the digital, which undoes physical social 
networks by dictating when, where, and with whom you can stay in 
touch and who are to be isolated from their peers.
COVID- 19 is a variation of a “corona” virus, which was given this 
name because its shape exhibits a fringe projection resembling 
the rarefied gaseous envelope of the sun or other stars. In the 
pandemic era, physical connections are precisely the ones that 
xviiare rarefied, and disconnection is no longer a fringe projection. 
While techniques of social distancing may succeed in physically 
isolating people from their offline environments, isolation does 
not necessarily extend to online spaces. Quite the contrary, many 
daily practices that used to happen face- to- face, from meetings to 
teaching and doctor’s appointments, are now being moved online. 
From playdates to after- work meetings, people are forging new 
social relations online. Those who left Facebook now consider 
returning in order to find a sense of community in self- isolation. 
Teleconferencing apps like Zoom, Skype, and FaceTime have taken 
on renewed significance. Newer social networks like Nextdoor 
are becoming places where people can seek and offer local help. 
For many, disconnecting from physical social circles amplifies the 
importance of their online counterparts.
In quarantine, social life plays out primarily online, where “social 
distancing” is a misnomer. In recent years, internet researchers 
have repeatedly shown that online connections can be very real 
and personal, and that physical distance in an era of digital media 
no longer amounts to social isolation (Baym 2010). In fact, the con-
cept preferred over “social distancing” by experts such as the World 
Health Organization is “physical distancing,” since the clear spatial 
order of the latter is more descriptive than the vague symbolism 
of the former. In a pandemic, physical disconnection becomes a 
pragmatic state of life itself.
When Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker were writing about 
networks more than a decade ago, they were demanding that we 
account for the unhuman aspects of these networks. We are no 
longer in control of even our own networks. With their emphasis on 
the unhuman side of the networks, Galloway and Thacker turn our 
attention to the “materiality of networks,” which “exhibits power re-
lations regardless of powerful individuals” (2007, 153). Their central 
argument is that the understanding of networks, especially digital 
ones, has been too human- centric, which leads scholars to neglect 
how network infrastructure, exemplified by protocols, establishes 
the very conditions for directing and distributing human action. 
xviii These claims have been developed and nuanced by software and 
platform studies, which have tended to invest in decentering the 
human from network analysis. Today, the unhumanity of networks 
is expressed by the uncontrollability of biological viruses and how, 
from the perspective of the virus, human bodies, human touch, 
and even human connection are nothing more than an exploitable 
structure in a contagious network.
Galloway and Thacker point out that “networks operate through 
ceaseless connections and disconnections . . . They are forever 
incomplete but always take on a shape” (2007, 156). When the 
humans are decentered from the physical proximity from each 
other, the power of the social takes other shapes. One place where 
the undone offline networks release their social power is online 
networks and different technologies of the social. Our physical 
social networks, however, do not just move from one environment 
to another, and social is not conflated with the digital without 
consequence. Just like in the offline world, also in the online world 
life shapes and is shaped by the networks where it happens. The 
problem is that digital networks are not merely unhuman but 
sometimes also inhuman. Once seen as an embodiment of partic-
ipatory democracy, many digital platforms have become networks 
for fake news, hate speech, and “offer the most destructive forces 
an ideal propaganda system” (Vaidhyanathan 2018, 195). The 
revenue of these platforms is based on exploiting not only users’ 
private information but also their behavioral patterns. Social media 
platforms actively define “what it means to be social, and what 
they think should be filtered out as anti- social” (Carmi 2020, 121). 
“Overconnection” has become recognized as a real problem (Baym 
et al. 2020). While digital networks are clearly exploitative of human 
value and draw new definitions for human capital, we are pushed 
even more deeply into them, in the era of COVID- 19, rather than 
disconnected from them. What used to be conceived as overcon-
nection becomes the default.
Before a vaccine is developed, the disciplinary mechanisms of 
disconnection are targeted toward networks; many of them are 
xixmethods of cutting links between the nodes, isolating individuals 
into smaller subsets that are easier to control. Simultaneously, 
jobs, education, and our personal relationships move from 
in- person meetings to online networks. This is a moment where 
we need studies of disconnection to make visible the in- and 
unhuman relations different networks make possible. But even 
more importantly, when the links are being cut, physical networks 
undone, and offline becomes substituted with the online, how 
to take care for each individual node becomes a question that 
needs to be addressed by these same studies. While Galloway and 
Thacker once encouraged us not to define digital networks from 
human- centric perspectives— because the human, by default, is not 
a central concern of these networks— human- centric perspectives 
are the very ones we now need.
Undoing Networks is an attempt to examine what it means to be 
in disconnection. What is the experience of being in the middle of 
things that break, disrupt, unfasten, and cut. In disconnection, 
we are faced with the activity of drawing the limits of a network 
and setting its boundaries. Internet celebrities are burning out, 
individuals are visiting digital detox camps, policymakers are 
imagining how to restrict social platforms, and people seem to be 
more conscious of their privacy. If the first two decades of this new 
millennium were about establishing different forms of connectivity 
from the birth of social media to algorithmic recommendation  
systems and the rise of the figure of the influencer, we are only 
now coming to terms with the wider cultural and political implica-
tions of this change. The downfall of the major social platforms  
and network models these firms have incorporated in their busi-
ness strategies and of which they have been benefitting from  
for two decades is perhaps not here yet. But it feels closer than 
before.
In disconnection, one is neither with nor against the networks 
but always somewhere in between. As Clara Wieghorst and 
Lea P. Zierott note in the opening to chapter 4, “disconnection is 
xx embedded in our everyday lives.” With its structure, this book tries 
to capture this embeddedness and show how our culture of ubiqui-
tous connectivity can be challenged and its fundamentals criticized 
and denaturalized from within. This introduction included, the 
book is built around five distinct components that are disconnected 
from each other methodologically and practically. The first chapter 
seeks for the role of the human in network theory from classical 
sociological texts to the emergence of 5G networks. The second 
and fourth chapters diverge from more traditional scholarly takes. 
The former interviews a fashion designer whose clothes are not 
for visibility but for privacy. The latter adopts the keywords format 
to articulate some of the nodes and edges in the network of 
disconnection studies. The third chapter undoes Facebook’s privacy 
proposition with a close reading of a technical feature. To follow 
the logic of undoing, the chapters invite the reader to a continuous 
process of connecting, disconnecting, and reconnecting.
In the first chapter, Urs Stäheli argues that we need to understand 
the genealogy of connectivity both within and beyond the digital. As 
a first step toward a sociology of undoing networks, Stäheli traces 
disconnection back to the works of sociologists Georg Simmel and 
Gabriel Tarde from around 1900. For Stäheli, these early forms 
of criticism of networking operate as performative concepts that 
produce the ways in which we now understand connectivities and 
disconnectivities. In other words, notions like hyperconnectivity 
(the possibility of overnetworking), figures of the shy or introverted 
type (networking is too much), and the condition of schizophrenia 
(everything is connected) each produce an understanding of 
connectivity that exceeds its technical aspects. With each of these 
seemingly individualized figures, however, Stäheli does not argue 
that disconnection is a subjective problem that can be cured with 
detoxes or self- care. Rather, he shows that problems of discon-
nection are part of the imaginaries of network culture; rather 
than being a mere corollary of connection, disconnection is thus 
productive as such. This approach allows Stäheli to rework the idea 
of disconnection— not as complete abstention from technologies of 
xxiconnectivity but as a strategic- tactical in- between area where new 
techniques and technologies can be designed and created.
Undoing appears in different forms. The work of engineers, 
activists, artists, and even entrepreneurs who design privacy tools, 
detox camps, and getting- things- done applications (Draper 2019; 
Fish 2017; Gregg 2018; Brunton and Nissenbaum 2015) provide 
insights on the cultural techniques of isolation, distancing, and 
obfuscation. In the second chapter of this book Lea P. Zierott in-
terviews fashion designer Nicole Scheller, who designs antisurveil-
lance clothes dedicated to concealing one’s identity. For Scheller, 
clothes are the only way to shield an individual’s privacy against 
the already- omnipresent cameras that now connect to ubiquitous 
recognition systems. For example, she works with a coating that re-
flects infrared light and knits pullovers with patterns that obstruct 
algorithmic recognition systems. Scheller makes visible the process 
that renders individuals legible to technology and makes them 
part of the discourses of connectivity. The interview highlights that 
conscious undoing demands activity and posits the importance of 
considering a maker’s perspective based on concrete materiality on 
disconnection.
In the third chapter, Tero Karppi explores Facebook’s “Off- Facebook 
Activity” privacy tool, which is designed to give individuals control 
over what information flows between Facebook and particular 
advertisers. “The best person to be in control of data is you,” 
declare the makers of the tool (Facebook 2020). But rather than 
empowering the users from the inside, Karppi argues, the very ex-
istence of the tool and its discourses serves to constitute a specific 
outside. Disconnection, in this case, means working on building 
boundaries and determining what Facebook is and what the limits 
of connectivity are. By doing a close reading of the promotional 
materials for the Off- Facebook Activity tool, Karppi maps how the 
tool draws technical borders between the Facebook platform, its 
users, and advertisers by disconnecting the links between them. 
Karppi also analyzes how the discourses around the tool nudge 
users toward particular forms of exteriority. In other words, when 
xxii the Off- Facebook Activity tool defines Facebook’s outside, it not 
only puts this definition into practice as a function of technology 
but also weaves it into the surrounding discourses. The limits 
of what lies outside networks are at once technical, social, and 
psychological.
The concluding section of the book aims to open new areas for 
studies of disconnection by ratifying some of the concepts and phe-
nomena where disconnection currently takes form. To this end, a 
glossary by Clara Wieghorst and Lea P. Zierott maps the discourse 
networks where disconnection currently appears, is examined, 
or should be. The keywords they explore range from specific 
empirical cases, such as dead zones, the right to disconnect, and the 
meaning of offline, to more general concepts, such as unfriending, 
unfollowing, and unplugging. The glossary as a whole illustrates that 
disconnection is never monolithic and, whether we like it or not, 
we are now confronted with a radically different imaginary where 
future belongs to disconnection.
 “There is much more to be learned from practice, from doing,” 
Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum (2015) maintain when writing 
about the different tactics and practices applied to protect privacy. 
Similarly, we hope to show that there is much to be learned from 
undoing— an activity where resistance makes sense to life and 
keeps the processes of the world open for something new. As this 
book shows, undoing is a complex practice. In fact, it is composed 
of different “disconnective practices” (Light 2014) that can untie 
the knots of connectivity, from detoxes to countersurveillance 
measures, from bans of technology to their failure. Each practice 
is unique and their research asks for methodologies dedicated to 
unpacking and deconstructing the elements that compose those 
networks, from technical features to the discourse networks that 
surround them. To undo is to bring down the dogmatic theories 
of connectivity according to which the elements of a network are 
conjoined, for example, by showing how the dominant network 
theories of the social are based on particular understandings 
of subjectivity, or asking who is benefitting from the modes of 
xxiiisociality current digital platforms make possible. Undoing networks 
underlines the fact that connectivity, especially in its digital forms, 
is artificially created, follows particular understandings of what a 
network is and who the users are, and is established for specific 
purposes. Undoing Networks is a call to think beyond the connected 
status of our current situation.
Notes
 1 This introduction was written during the first wave of the pandemic. It maps 
how the situation developed in the spring of 2020.
 2 Writing a book is always a collective effort. On behalf of myself and the other 
authors of this book, I would like to express our gratitude to Timon Beyes for 
his help with managing the entire process; Melissa Gregg and Finn Brunton for 
providing valuable feedback; Erik Born for translations, copyediting, and feed-
back; and Inga Luchs for helping us with formatting the chapters.
 3 See https://covid19.apple.com/contacttracing.
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Only a few years ago, “networking” appeared to be a prophetic 
buzzword, “making connections” an emancipatory slogan.1 Hardly 
any area of culture or society was immune to the demand to 
network better, which is to say, to make more contacts, strengthen 
existing ties, and, in the words of one industry’s refashioned ABCs, 
“always be connecting.” Networking was supposed to flatten out 
corporate hierarchies and transform traditional companies into 
highly interconnected organizations. It provided a virulent image 
for political movements, which came to understand themselves as 
flexible, extensible, and modular systems. Networking even found 
a place in “relational art,” which turned audience participation into 
an interactive aesthetic practice. Digital networking, in particular, 
was nowhere more celebrated than in early internet discourses, 
which took making connections to be a means of liberation from 
once- exclusionary structures. To the technological avant- garde 
(documented in magazines like the aptly named Wired ) and critics 
of Internet culture alike, democratic participation seemed to 
herald a better and more open future, and a participatory principle 
appeared to have been hardwired into digital technologies, coded 
directly into social media platforms.2
In retrospect, however, networking appears to have been more 
of an imposition. Indeed, we are currently witnessing nothing 
2 less than the exhaustion of networking— and not only in the 
enforcement of “social distancing” or the widespread diagnosis 
of “burnout.” While ubiquitous networking is proving to be an 
exhausting activity for many individuals, it simultaneously creates 
an ever tighter and more suffocating network of social control. 
According to Kate Losse, one of the first Facebook employees, an 
early speechwriter for Mark Zuckerberg, and later a sharp feminist 
critic of the platform, networking was originally a hopeful aspira-
tion. In a disillusioned retrospective, Losse describes the hippie 
spirit pervading early social networks, which once had a “moralistic 
sense of the mission: of connecting people, connecting the world. 
It’s hard to argue with that. What’s wrong with connecting people? 
Nothing, right?” (Kulwin 2018). At the time, the purpose of con-
necting more and more people (and things) seemed self- evident: 
It was not only a realization of technical possibilities but also a 
step toward a better and more open society. Hence, the founders 
and early developers of social media platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter were surprised when their original utopia succumbed to the 
dual logic of surveillance and economization captured in Shoshana 
Zuboff’s analysis of “surveillance capitalism” (2019). Even the radical 
theorists of digital network cultures have become disillusioned with 
networking. While the internet was once taken to be a realization of 
the flexible and antihierarchical structure of the “rhizome,” a critical 
concept adopted from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s social the-
ory of power from the 1970s, the lofty expectations of digital cul-
tures have fallen far short of the target. One of the leading media 
theorists of contemporary digital cultures, Alexander Galloway, 
who at first argued vehemently under a Deleuzian framework, now 
succinctly demands that we “Forget Deleuze!” (Berry and Galloway 
2016). Otherwise, political enthusiasm for the internet comes too 
easily under the spell of the same control society it criticizes.
Should networking still be separated from these recent devel-
opments and thereby salvaged, assuming that it even remains 
desirable in and of itself? Where does the notion that connectivity 
is an intrinsic good come from? And how did the act of making 
3connections come to represent an ethical and political duty (most 
prominently with the figure of the networker whom Boltanski and 
Chiapello [2007] have identified as key component of a new spirit 
of capitalism)? These questions are significant in more than one 
respect: The concept of connectivity not only points to a central 
foundation of contemporary digital networks but also to the need 
for a much longer genealogy of connectivity, which cannot be 
reduced to the digital. Today, the notion of connectivity, the ability 
to make connections and expand networks, leaves an imprint on 
nearly every aspect of society, from predigital social contacts to 
the digital devices required by social networks. While connectivity 
clearly informs social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and 
Tumblr, it also affects social areas that may initially seem to be 
“nondigital”: the point of making small talk at parties now appears 
to be making important cultural or economic contacts; the purpose 
of academic networking events to be creating interdisciplinary 
conversations among once- isolated disciplines. In these situations, 
the first virtue of networking appears to be the constant willingness 
to make new contacts, combined with the corresponding ability 
to resist the disappointment caused by failed attempts (Boltanski 
and Chiapello 2007). The principles of networking have assumed 
an all- encompassing logic in Western societies, contributing 
to a widespread “fetish of connectivity” (Pedersen 2013). The 
logic of connectivity goes hand in hand with an entire arsenal of 
semantics, techniques, and technologies, which turn it into an 
ethico- political program that is only partly captured by the notion 
of self- optimization. While the ethos of self- optimization pro-
duced the now- familiar figure of “networkers,” who work both to 
maintain their active networks and to improve their ability to make 
connections, this seemingly subjective figure only condenses and 
illustrates a different logic that cannot be reduced to any form of 
subjectivation. In its elemental structure, the ethos of connectivity 
functions in a nonsubjective manner, since it always refers to the 
expansion and intensification of networks. “To connect” turns into 
a moral imperative, addressing human and nonhuman actors alike. 
Connectivity does not primarily refer to individual experiences, 
4 affects, and mental states but to a specific form of the generativity 
of networks: the becoming self- referential of making connections. 
It is this logic that the notion of networks presupposes and fosters: 
to produce connections for connections’ sake. Drawing from 
actor– network theory (ANT), the notion of networks is not reduced 
to digital networks but always comprises human and nonhuman 
connections. Thus, my argument is not to juxtapose technological 
network connectivity with human connectivity. This would only lead 
to a familiar and nostalgic narrative of media critique that tries to 
salvage true connections from reified digital connections. Rather, I 
argue it is necessary to uncover the sociotechnological impositions 
that go along with the establishment of connectivity as an ethico- 
political good of its own.
Genealogies	of	Hyperconnection
As soon as the expansion of networks, the incessant creation of 
new connections, becomes an end in itself, the perceived excess 
in the concept of connection gets problematized in terms of “hy-
perconnection.” This also means that the origins of contemporary 
diagnoses of a crisis in networking cannot be equated with the on-
going digitalization of social life, reducing the idea of networks to a 
technological idea. In sociological diagnoses of the present, the first 
traces of hyperconnection already started to appear around 1900. 
With the notion of the “blasé attitude,” Georg Simmel examined 
how “the metropolitan type . . . develops an organ protecting him 
against the threatening currents and discrepancies of his external 
environment which would uproot him” (Simmel 1950, 410). In addi-
tion to his diagnosis of a nascent crisis, Simmel’s emphasis on the 
formation of a blasé attitude presents indifference as one of the 
earliest techniques of undoing networks, albeit still in an individual 
form. Following its early aestheticization in the figure of the dandy, 
this indifferent attitude would eventually become one of the most 
important techniques for navigating digital environments. Recent 
years have seen increasing reflection on attention and distraction, 
even talk of an entire “ethics of indifference” (Tonkiss 2003). In 
5these contemporary contexts, “indifference” describes the possibil-
ity of navigating networked situations without succumbing to the 
ethos of connectivity, which also raises a theoretical question that 
I can only hint at (Stäheli 2020): Can we conceive of co- presence 
without necessarily understanding it as an interactive relation?3
Around 1900, Simmel’s contemporary Gabriel Tarde developed 
his own sociology of imitation, which Bruno Latour reads as a 
forerunner of actor– network theory and an early account of the 
social as networked (Latour 2002). At some points, however, Tarde 
was more critical of his own principle of universal imitation, since a 
society based on perfect imitation could easily lose its rich sense of 
innovation and thus its dynamism, eventually becoming monoto-
nous and homogeneous. For Tarde, the expression of this kind of 
society, which he saw characterized by its medial structures and its 
ability to generate endless statistical data long before the advent 
of “digital” society, was the figure of the somnambulist. A perfect 
medium for channeling imitation, the somnambulist transmits af-
fects, ideas, and practices without any resistance (Tarde 1903, 76). 
If one is deliberately looking for the limits of Tarde’s early analysis 
of network society, one will immediately come across the somnam-
bulist’s counterpart in another embodiment of indifference— the 
shy, timid, or introverted type. According to Tarde, “timidity is a 
conscious and, consequently, an incomplete magnetization . . . It is 
a nascent social state which accompanies every transition from one 
society to another” (86; emphasis in the original).4 Introverts tend 
to disrupt the otherwise free- flowing channel of imitation because 
they distrust the very process of networking, constantly worrying 
that they might make a faux pas. For Tarde, introverts are inade-
quately socialized and thus remain too resistant, on an individual 
level, to serve as a perfect transmission medium.
Tarde was hardly alone in his interest in introversion and other 
forms of deviation from the perceived norms of connectivity. The 
turn of the century witnessed the development of a wide- ranging 
sociopsychological discourse of introverts, who were seen as obsta-
cles to social networking situations on account of their reluctance 
6 to communicate (Duga 1922). As a result, introversion came to 
be pathologized, and the inability to socialize in casual situations 
was turned into a disease to be treated. In a manner of treatment 
that would eventually become typical of the network society’s 
burn- out cases, widespread figures of disconnection were classified 
as pathologies, disorders, and accidents, thereby reinforcing the 
dominant imperatives of connection.
Refusing to participate in the widespread pathologization of 
introversion, Tarde expressed remarkable sympathy for introverts’ 
perceived inability to make connections, which he even took to 
contain the contours of a new ability. The “inability” is not simply a 
deficiency but a competency of its own, which goes along with a set 
of practices. It is this that I call the undoing of networks: neither a 
simple negation of networks, nor just unplugging from networks, 
but practices within networks that question their ethico- political 
impositions of connectivity. This sympathy is particularly evident 
in Tarde’s subsequent reframing of his sociology of imitation so as 
to account for that of non- imitation. In the Preface to the Second 
Edition of The Laws of Imitation, Tarde asserts that “the fact of 
not imitating when there is no contact . . . is merely a non- social 
relation, but the fact of not imitating the neighbor who is in touch 
with us, puts us upon a footing of really anti- social relations with 
him” (1903, xix; emphasis added). Rather than the mere absence 
of imitation, non- imitation would constitute an independent social 
relation, which needs to be distinguished, in turn, from counterim-
itation. The crucial implication of Tarde’s revised sociology is that 
non- imitation gives rise to a particular mode of existence, which, 
even in the presence of spatial proximity and social contact, would 
not imply interactivity. What I call undoing networks inhabits this 
conceptual space between connectivity and nonconnectivity: the 
creation and experimenting with practices that are indifferent 
but not external to networks. While Tarde never elaborated on 
this nascent theoretical program, it marks the precise point of 
departure for a sociology of undoing networks, which could be 
about more than simply leaving networks or attempting to destroy 
7them. Instead, it needs to address the seemingly disconnected 
forms of coexistence that do not create any social connections in 
an emphatic sense. At the same time, the sociology of undoing 
networks needs to treat disconnection as a social phenomenon, 
which implies fundamental theoretical questions about the limits 
of relationality and challenges any theory that views relationality as 
the defining criterion of the social (Stäheli 2020).5
The	Desire	for	Real	Connection
In comparison to Simmel’s and Tarde’s radical outlines of con-
nection and disconnection, many contemporary attempts to deal 
with hyperconnection are bound to be disappointing. In recent 
years, the most common pattern of argumentation has been to 
locate the problem not in networking per se but only in its false 
and reified forms. To salvage some original sense of human con-
nectivity, which is generally assumed to be “good,” the common 
argument preserves and often even strengthens a universalizing 
anthropology of homo conexus (Bay 2011),6 the same image of the 
networked human being that has long served to legitimize network 
companies. Along these lines, José van Dijck (2013) argues that the 
“culture of connectedness,” which once stood for the democratic 
and participatory hopes placed on the pre- economized internet, 
has been replaced by an algorithmically controlled “culture of 
connectivity.” Critiques of digital culture, which are especially prom-
inent in Germany given the nation’s current skepticism toward 
technology, make the problems of connection and disconnection 
sound even easier. Against the cold and virtual feel of the digital, 
which may appear to create an autonomous, nonhuman space, 
critics of digital culture stress the perceived warmth of the analog 
as the only real space for human society. Exemplarily, the title 
of one German- language guide to contemporary digital society, 
Analog ist das neue Bio, proclaims “the analog” to be “the new or-
ganic” (Wilkens 2015). To many critics of digital culture, the analog 
represents a refuge for cultivating what they assume makes us 
truly human, from profound emotions to deep conversations. As 
8 the last bastion of traditional society, it must be defended by any 
means necessary, which is nowhere more evident than in the “digi-
tal detox” tourism industry. One particularly visible company, Camp 
Grounded, made a name for itself by organizing disconnection and 
detoxification camps for adults in particularly beautiful and remote 
areas of Northern California (Digital Detox® 2020).7 Their motto: 
“Disconnect to Reconnect.” From detox resorts and disconnection 
guidebooks to self- care services and management consultancies, 
the idea of “digital detox” has been imitated globally. Once again, it 
is striking that the proponents of disconnection do not necessarily 
criticize the idea of connectivity per se; they even presume one’s 
familiarity with digital networking as a means of paving the way 
for what they consider to be even more intensive forms of analog 
networking. Ignoring one’s Facebook timeline, refraining from up-
loading photos to Instagram, perhaps even abstaining entirely from 
using one’s smartphone for a few days— these simple measures 
are ultimately intended to serve the noble purpose of getting closer 
to both oneself and others. In the vein of classic cultural criticism, 
digital technology takes on the role of the only obstacle standing in 
the way of one’s path toward the real and the true (Bollmer 2016).8
These utopias of disconnection, which may sound more like 
dystopias, attempt to draw a neat dividing line between two forms 
of connectivity: an originary form of normal human connectivity 
and its later pathological forms that the current rhetoric of “digital 
detox” revives (Sutton 2017). In the new dietetic and therapeutic 
regime, the digital is taken to be a toxin, in analogy to sugar, alco-
hol, or drugs, that needs to be eliminated from the body through 
disciplined work on the self, with the analog representing a sort of 
superfood. Apart from assuming a clear- cut distinction between 
the digital and the analog, which can hardly be maintained, utopias 
of disconnection also set in motion a perfidious regime of personal 
responsibility (Jurgenson 2013). Since individuals are taken to be 
responsible for their own unhealthy networking behaviors, they 
can be tasked with protecting themselves against digital temptation 
and developing a more sustainable lifestyle. Describing excessive 
9digital consumption as an addiction serves to moralize individual 
failing and turn it into something that can be remedied through 
therapies, self- examination, educational measures, and self- help 
guides. As a result, the question of networking is ultimately 
privatized, even if the classic private sphere, which gave rise to 
liberal notions of self- responsibility in the first place, no longer 
exists. Hence, individuals are faced with an insoluble problem, 
insofar as they are supposed to assume responsibility for their 
own networking activity but without possessing the autonomy of 
the classic liberal self.
Any analysis of contemporary networking finds itself faced with 
an equally challenging dilemma, for which there may initially 
appear to be only two alternatives. Continuing to cool down the 
once- heated celebration of networking might end up furthering 
the technocratic project of increasing prosperity and happiness, 
though it would still remain tied to this social project’s original 
aim of endlessly improving networking. Then there is the equally 
problematic retreat to an idealized analog world, which frequently 
smacks of Luddism and is by no means as innocent as it may 
appear. As a moralizing technology of “responsibilization” (Shamir 
2008), disconnection from the digital seeks to immunize itself 
against any potential criticism through its purported knowledge of 
realness and authenticity (Portwood- Stacer 2013). In this current 
impasse, the only thing that analog nostalgists may appear to 
have in common with digital apologists is deep disdain. However, 
these two seemingly irreconcilable positions are united on an even 
deeper level in their shared belief in the power of making “real” 
connections.
Critiques of connectivity need to deal with this kind of common 
ground, which can often be found in a belief in the power of 
connectivity. Grant Bollmer (2016) rightly points out that con-
temporary network discourses, regardless of whether they are 
critical or affirmative, tend to presume a certain anthropology of 
the networked subject, which is often only latent. The constant 
development of novel networking technologies is predicated on 
10 one particular image of human beings: Being human means living 
in and through relationships; it depends on both the ability and 
willingness to make connections with others. If one accepts this 
image of humanity, one would immediately feel an obligation to 
care for its core aspects and to keep developing and refining tech-
nologies of networking the self. The only thing left to argue about 
would be whether particular networking techniques are “right” or 
“wrong,” “sick” or “healthy,” “efficient” or “inefficient”; there would 
be no arguing about the ironclad principle of connectivity itself.  
Ultimately, this anthropology of connectivity, which takes the 
essence of human beings to consist in their ability to cultivate 
relationships and make connections, reinforces the contemporary 
imperative to network, whether in digital or analog form.
Network Fever
When I speak of “networks,” I am referring to far more than digital 
interfaces and technical infrastructures. One of the simplest 
definitions of a network is the links (aka “edges”) among various 
intersections (aka “nodes”), which result in specific patterns of 
connection. According to this definition, the internet is only one 
among many networks, which also include companies, circles of 
friends, mafia- like organizations, transportation infrastructures, 
and global trade relations. In recent years, this classic conception 
of networks has been subject to many critiques for presuming the 
existence of discrete and independent units. One alternative can be 
found in Latour’s actor– network theory, which emphasizes that the 
nodes defined as “actants” are themselves the result of networking 
(Latour 2005), thereby shifting our focus to the actual work of net-
working (i.e., making connections) and making the otherwise static 
concept of the network dynamic. From this perspective, networks 
bring together a heterogeneous ensemble of actors and thrive on 
their own seemingly infinite extensibility, precisely because they 
no longer have any clear borders. Furthermore, the absence of 
clear borders allows the ethos of connectivity described above to 
be embedded into the very structure of the network: the potential 
11to expand ad infinitum becomes a demand to do so. Lastly, this 
revised view of networking emphasizes that network concepts are 
not merely descriptive categories; they have their own performa-
tive effect and produce the activity of connecting they describe.
Networks are always more than mere descriptive, technical cate-
gories. The imperative to connect, thereby expanding the network, 
feeds on a deep- seated anxiety. Wendy Chun (2006) even describes 
the internet in terms of its “paranoid” structure. There is never 
any position outside the network from which it can be seen in full; 
there is always the danger that parts of the network could fail, that 
the entire network could get out of control, that connections could 
be lost or amount to nothing. From the hypothetical perspective 
of the network itself, there is always a risk that the delicate web 
might be damaged and that individual components might fail. How 
do networks react to these deep- seated anxieties, which are not 
incidental but rather inscribed right into their sociotechnical struc-
ture? The answer is simple: with even more networking! Constant 
surveillance and multilayered controls ensure knowledge of the 
network’s current state. A paranoid network is insatiable. What was 
once an advantage— being able to expand without much additional 
effort— quickly becomes part of the problem, as expansion triggers 
more expansion. Network anxiety may be temporarily calmed by 
the creation of additional networks but these in turn create more 
anxiety. Quite appropriately, architecture theorist Mark Wigley 
(2001) speaks of “network fever.”
One main aspect of this contemporary network fever might actually 
be better described with a concept drawn from early schizophrenia 
research of the 1950s. According to gestalt psychologist Klaus Con-
rad, the insatiable desire to make connections is characteristic of 
the beginning stages of schizophrenia. For the tendency to perceive 
connections between otherwise unconnected things and events, 
Conrad coined the term “apophenia” (Conrad 1958). In Conrad’s 
analysis, there is no such thing as coincidence for aphopheniacs: 
If they miss the tram, they take it to be a sign that some invisible 
power crossed their path; if a neighbor fails to greet them, they 
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Always on the search for the unidentified connections responsible 
for contingent occurrences, apopheniacs end up connecting ran-
dom events. They are characterized, in Conrad’s analysis, by their 
equally inexhaustible and fantastical desire to make connections 
and uncover hidden patterns. Conrad’s long- forgotten concept of 
apophenia has witnessed a massive revival with the contempo-
rary study of “big data,”9 which is another matter of uncovering 
patterns in seemingly endless amounts of data, only to put them 
in the service of, let’s say, risk analysis and migration control. From 
apophenia to anxiety, the vocabulary of psychopathology now 
commonly used to describe network dynamics calls attention to 
the fact that our current ethos of connectivity was until only very 
recently still perceived to be something in need of explanation. A 
certain pathological logic is now inscribed directly into networks— 
the logic of suspicion, distrust, and uncontrollable intensification, 
which is simultaneously that of creativity, pattern identification, 
and making surprising connections.
Hyperconnection is not an accident; it does not befall networks 
from the outside, does not result merely from the rash and blind 
propagation of more and more comprehensive systems. What is 
to blame for hyperconnection is the immanent logic of unlimited 
growth. Digital technologies make particularly efficient use of 
this logic by exploiting possibilities that are inherent in network 
thinking. Networking increasingly is becoming a self- referential 
process: In unnecessary meetings, distracted managers constantly 
sneak a peek at their smartphones, only to plan the next equally 
inconsequential meeting.
For a long time, however, network fever was much less noticeable. 
If networking can liberate everyone from rigid hierarchies and 
create new opportunities for access, what problems could there 
possibly be? Why should anyone be suspicious of the possibility to 
communicate with more and more people, to connect with more 
and more things? For their own part, cultural studies and the social 
sciences have been ill- prepared for the unforeseen crisis of the 
13network society, insofar as they still tend to view networks and 
other forms of entanglement as forms of liberation from older 
approaches, which are easy to dismiss as essentialist. Whether in 
Latour’s actor– network theory, which dreams of denser and denser 
forms of heterogeneous networks, Deleuze’s heady celebration of 
a weed- like rhizome, which linked up with hippie counterculture, or 
Niklas Luhmann’s development of systems theory, which signaled a 
switch to the much drier notion of connectivity— these perspectives 
put a premium on making connections and remain fascinated by its 
seemingly undreamt- of possibilities.
Practices	of	Undoing	Networks
The questions of severing and slowing down connections, of thin-
ning out networks and identifying an excess of connections were 
long described only in terms of unintentional network malfunc-
tions, which needed to be eliminated whenever possible.10 In re-
cent years, however, a wide range of fields that originally ridiculed 
any counterreactions to the dominant ethos of connectivity have 
started taking them seriously. We are now witnessing the emer-
gence of various practices of undoing networks, which were never 
accounted for in theory, never factored into the plans with all the 
network euphoria. Even in the business world, the once- dominant 
figure of the networker is increasingly subject to competition, as 
more companies discover the strengths of those employees long 
accused of lacking the required capacity for teamwork due to their 
lack of enthusiasm for socializing. In bestsellers like Susan Cain’s 
Quiet (2013), introverts are presented as a long- neglected economic 
resource, since they work more reliably and with greater concen-
tration than talkative networkers.
There have been parallel developments in many other fields. In 
workplace design, the primary model for a creative workspace was, 
for a long time, the “open office,” which was invented in Quickborn 
near Hamburg in the 1950s.11 Now viewed with much greater 
skepticism, the fate of open offices was eventually tied to that of 
rapidly spreading “co- working spaces,” which led to a veritable 
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many employees today still long for their own office, a closed space 
that might offer some form of protection against the need to be 
reachable at all times. In a similar trend, networking was long seen 
as a guarantee of security for critical infrastructures, since dense 
military or energy networks could continue to function in the event 
of a crisis. Today, however, there are increasing calls to take many 
of these critical infrastructures offline, since they have become 
vulnerable to cyberattacks in ways that can no longer be controlled 
(Gaycken and Karger 2011). Some of the most visible techniques 
of disconnection are prominent among the most connected users: 
various software providers offer apps that restrict uncontrolled 
surfing for a limited period of time; signal- blocking cell phone 
cases are intended to ensure that users are not reachable for a 
given period of time; bars and restaurants advertise that they offer 
mobile free zones; vacation hotels are deliberately built in cellular 
dead zones like the Scottish Highlands; anonymization software 
promises to make the individual user invisible, untrackable, and 
thus no longer addressable by the growing surveillance apparatus. 
The list could go on and on, though it is already clear that the crisis 
of networking has led to new experiments with undoing networks, 
which are hardly always successful.
The current engagement with disconnection differs significantly 
from older fantasies of checking out, encapsulated in the 
countercultural mantra, “Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out.” Undoing 
networks today does not necessarily mean starting a life outside 
the network, thereby leaving it completely behind. Even if many 
current attempts to disconnect are not entirely free from nos-
talgia for earlier forms of checking out, especially in their own 
conceptions of themselves, their practices still operate exclusively 
within networks.12 Undoing networks describes a paradoxical 
undertaking, which requires using networks to disconnect from 
networks. Thus, it is not a simple on/off distinction at play here but 
rather the zone of neither/nor. Undoing networks, thus, does not 
mean completely withdrawing from networks, nor the naïve idea of 
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of undoing networks,” I do not intend to frame them as a subjective 
problem, as in the popular discourses of digital detox and other 
forms of self- care. Nor do I intend to claim that there is some 
absolute state of disconnection. Pitting the overworked individual 
against the inexorable structure of the network would create an 
accurate image only of the underlying logic informing critiques of 
networks, rather than networks themselves. Furthermore, it would 
not provide many insights into the logic of disconnection, nor 
would it represent the necessary departure point for a sociology 
of undoing networks, insofar as it again dredges up the classic 
opposition between society and the individual. For practices of 
disconnection, the reference point is neither the individual subject 
nor the surrounding society but the connecting network. Network 
fever has made the underlying logic of hyperconnection start to 
appear more problematic, which has in turn given rise to new 
practices of undoing networks. Crucially, these new practices reveal 
that simply leaving networks or switching them off are not viable 
alternatives but oversimplifications, which fail to acknowledge the 
simultaneity of connection and disconnection. By “simultaneity,” I 
mean not only the logical conclusion that whenever people connect 
to one network, they disconnect from another, or that connection 
goes hand in hand with disconnection. While this perspective runs 
the risk of making disconnecting into the mere correlative of con-
necting, neither of which would have any positive characteristics in 
and of itself, it might also make visible an independent reservoir of 
practices, technologies, and infrastructures of undoing networks.
These heterogeneous practices of undoing networks are charac-
terized by a certain directionality, insofar as they take the problem 
of hyperconnectivity as an opportunity to develop alternative 
practices for creating a state of disconnectivity. Turning hypercon-
nection into a problem is the first step toward undoing networks. 
This directionality, or tendency to disconnect, derives more from 
this network- focused “problematization” (in the Foucauldian sense) 
than from any individual intentions of the actors involved. I do not 
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tion necessarily produces this trajectory on its own in a quasi- 
functionalistic manner. My claim is that disconnection is always 
already inscribed into practices and technologies of hyperconnec-
tion as its imaginary dimension. Rather than an underlying ideology 
or an external symbolic framework for practices, the imaginary di-
mension of undoing networks constitutes an intrinsic part of these 
practices.13 Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined 
communities” (Anderson 2006),14 I would argue that there has 
always been an infrastructural foundation to this imaginary, insofar 
as it refers to the medial constitution of networking (Langenohl 
2019). However, the imaginary dimension of these practices need 
not primarily suggest a community of the disconnected; rather, 
it might help sound out the limits of networks and make their 
experience possible. In this respect, a temporal structure plays a 
decisive role in the imaginary dimension of these practices, as it 
does in Sheila Jasanoff’s definition of sociotechnical imaginaries on 
the whole— namely, “collectively held and performed visions of de-
sirable futures (or of resistance against the undesirable)” (2015, 28). 
Hence, there is no such thing as “pure,” “raw,” or “given” practices 
of undoing networks; they are always loaded with hopes, fears, and 
expectations of the future. For the status of practices as undoing, it 
is irrelevant whether the imagined futures of disconnection— or of 
being less connected— are attained, since success or failure are not 
criteria for deciding whether a practice qualifies as disconnection. It 
is rather the bounded imaginaries of a state less connected or even 
disconnected that  constitute practices of undoing networks.
Tactics	and	Strategies	of	Undoing	Networks
The directionality of disconnection practices, which is produced by 
its imaginary dimension, can be analyzed through a classic distinc-
tion that dates back to Michel de Certeau’s sociology of everyday 
life, which was in turn derived from Prussian general and military 
theorist Karl von Clausewitz— namely, “tactics” and “strategies.” 
For Certeau, tactics are situation- dependent and often cunning 
17practices, which have no particular space of their own: “The space 
of a tactic is the space of the other . . . It does not have the means 
to keep to itself, at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, foresight, 
and self- collection” (de Certeau 1984, 37; emphasis in the original). 
By contrast, strategies create their own space— a permanent 
one, if possible— from which they can operate in a rational mode. 
Certeau “call[s] a ‘strategy’ the calculus of force- relationships which 
becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, 
an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from 
an ‘environment’” (xix). In this respect, we can draw a preliminary 
distinction between tactics and strategies of undoing networks. 
Operating on networks without any sovereign space of their own, 
tactics of undoing networks do not assume an exhausted but 
resilient subject. Furthermore, they are not about creatively appro-
priating network resources or establishing alternatives and carrying 
out disruptive media campaigns, as in discussions of “tactical 
media.” Rather, tactics of undoing networks exploit moments, such 
as partial network failure, when weaknesses appear in the imper-
ative to connect itself (Mannell 2017, 44); when the imperative to 
connect appears particularly grotesque, they can even undermine 
it and thereby organize non- addressability. In contrast to the 
euphoric reception of Certeau in the spirit of participatory media 
and the DIY movement, undoing networks is more about tactics of 
incommunicability.
At the same time, we also need to modify Certeau’s concept of 
strategy for disconnection. There may be a space for strategies of 
undoing networks— for instance, in businesses that develop their 
own strategies for dealing with burnout and a perceived lack of effi-
ciency. But they also have an imaginary dimension, and one of their 
most immediate effects is to insinuate and create a discursive unit 
that is supposed to be capable of precisely this kind of strategic 
action. One might speak here of an imaginary “misrecognition” (in 
an almost classic psychoanalytic sense). However, we also need to 
take the functionality of these strategies seriously, since they struc-
ture an important part of how we both speak about disconnection 
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tion strategies is that they formulate their imaginary in close range 
to functionalistic concepts and tend to frame hyperconnection as a 
solvable problem. For instance, a company may find that too much 
time is being spent on meetings and thus attempt to optimize its 
schedule with mapping software, thereby turning disconnection 
into a clearly workable problem with a measurable outcome— in 
this case, reducing the number of hours spent on meetings. From 
scholarship on the sociology of organizations, however, we know 
that corporate strategies hardly ever work, at least not for what 
they hope for. Nevertheless, companies continue to develop these 
strategies, especially for the problem of disconnection. It is there-
fore crucial to take the form of strategic formulations seriously 
without assuming that they will necessarily result in the intended 
outcome.
Another immediate effect of these strategies is to commodify 
disconnection by constructing it as a consumable but reliable 
“experience” (Pine and Gilmore 2011). In this respect, it is worth 
emphasizing that the nascent disconnection industry, from discon-
nection guides through detox resorts to management consulting, 
was essentially created by the pioneers of network platforms 
themselves, such as Randy Zuckerberg’s efforts to encourage digi-
tal unplugging (Zuckerberg 2013) or “Camp Grounded,” which was 
founded by Felix Levy after his Silicon Valley career. According to 
the network logic of infinite extensibility, social media continue to 
create new possibilities of connection, while wireless sensors and 
RFID chips are creating an entire Internet of Things. Even if there 
appears to be no end in sight for the proliferation and expansion 
of networks, the disconnected or unnetworked type is increasingly 
attracting the attention of businesspeople, such as Randi Zucker-
berg, who is now developing special detox offers for stressed- out 
networkers. In an interesting turn of events, disconnection— or, to 
be precise, ideas about what a disconnected life might look like— is 
considered not only to be a vast space for new networking projects 
but also something that can be exploited by the experience 
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discovery, treatment, and commodification of the disconnected.
Disconnection strategies make themselves and their images of 
disconnection highly visible. Claiming to know in advance what a 
life without networks might look like, they attempt to embed the 
very disconnection they hope to create into the functional logic of 
local networks. Whether as a novel luxury experience, a security 
control for critical infrastructures, or an organizational mecha-
nism governing efficiency and creativity, disconnecting is widely 
presented as a disciplinary strategy requiring mastery, which again 
reflects the brave and heroic narratives of blogs and guidebooks. 
In this respect, disconnection strategies are always strategies of 
power. They are bound up with the questions of who determines 
the extent of disconnection and in what manner, which techniques 
of disconnection are to be deployed, and who has access to which 
forms of disconnection. When analyzing strategic programs and 
their corresponding assertions, we should not automatically 
assume that they will function smoothly, thereby reinforcing their 
description of themselves. Our analysis also needs to account for 
changes in sovereignty: The sovereign is still the one who is in a 
position to make decisions about disconnection, but any clear 
decision is impossible due to the complex structure of practices 
and infrastructures involved in any form of disconnection.
While strategies of disconnection are highly visible, their corre-
sponding tactics are largely invisible or inconspicuous. Without 
their own locus of power, disconnection tactics correspond better 
to the logic of decentralized and heterogenous networks than 
to the illusion of sovereignty evident in disconnection strategies. 
While disconnection tactics are also charged with their own 
imaginary dimension, moreover, they are supported by a much 
vaguer sense of what disconnection might look like. In this respect, 
disconnection tactics do not follow the classic model of strategic 
thought and action, since they do not formulate a clear problem, 
nor do they develop systematic techniques and practices to solve 
it— indeed, they even dispense with the visionary formulation of 
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disconnection tactics often develop experimental and situational 
forms of incommunicability, imperceptibility, and withdrawal. The 
figure of the introvert takes on an exemplary role here, insofar 
as introverts attempt, whether consciously or unconsciously, to 
withdraw from the demands of communication by making them as 
imperceptible as possible— ideally, disappearing into the architec-
ture of an inner space. In contrast to the heroism of disconnection 
strategies, these are tactics of the weak, who often have a better 
sense of the intricacies of network logic than do any elaborately 
designed strategies. The foundation of disconnection tactics is 
not an exaggerated sovereign ability to disconnect but what one 
might call, adapting the sociological concept of “connectivity,” “dis- 
connectivity.” In contrast to the sociological concept of connectivity 
(Anschlussfähigkeit, i.e. the ability to connect), disconnectivity 
stresses the inability to connect (Anschlussunfähigkeit).15 This 
inability itself is, however, in contrast to the classical concept: not a 
deficiency, not something that just happens, but an often invisible 
ability of its own— a nonsovereign undoing of networks. That is also 
why the humanist anthropology of the naturally connected subject 
fails in providing critical perspectives on network cultures, since it 
shares and legitimizes their ethos of connectivity. In my discussion 
of early sociological ideas of network societies I’ve emphasized 
precisely these moments of turning away from the imperative to 
connect such as the figure of the introvert. They are characterized 
by an inability to make connections, which I do not mean to 
present as a failing or a deficit, as in the pathologizing discourse, 
but rather as an ability to be cultivated. Along these lines, Alexan-
der Galloway speaks of “insufficiency” as the foundation for any 
critique of network society (Galloway and LaRiviere 2017).
Even if their elementary logic makes tactics function quite differ-
ently from strategies, they hardly ever occur in a pure and isolated 
form. The present typology is intended only as a heuristic, which 
can help us better understand the respective proportions in 
various mixtures. It might also help clarify their mutual interde-
21pendencies, since strategies of undoing networks are often based 
on the observation and rearticulation of corresponding tactics. 
Take the crisis of the open- office model, which was introduced 
above. To deal with the attendant challenges of disconnection 
and communication, there is now an entire arsenal of tactics of 
withdrawal, which aim to make one temporarily unavailable. At 
first, these tactics were seen as technical problems, often related to 
measures of discipline and control. With the increased criticism of 
hyperconnectivity, especially the notion of tireless communication 
among interconnected teams, these kinds of evasive tactics have 
taken on a new meaning. Instead of disciplining individuals, they 
now provide the template for new strategies of disconnecting, 
such as building retreat sites into organizational plans or having 
mandatory periods of noncommunication. The same trend can be 
observed in the development of situational tactics into strategies of 
resistance, such as the massive difficulties accompanying individual 
attempts to withdraw from social media platforms like Facebook 
(Karppi 2018). In these cases, artistic projects like the Suicide 
Machine can make visible the imperative to connect, while also 
providing technologies of disconnection. Similarly, attempts at ano-
nymization, which may be laborious and often fail, also give rise to 
anonymization software and strategies of hypertrophy, such as the 
creation of misleading data sets. Once again, these examples show 
that any narrative proceeding from the appropriation of tactics to 
hegemonic strategies is an overly simplistic construction. In many 
fields, it is precisely the border between tactics and strategies that 
proves to be a fertile space for experimentation and the emer-
gence of new technologies of undoing networks. Artistic projects 
often play an important role here, especially those interested in the 
materiality of disconnection, exemplified by wearables,16 Faraday 
cages,17 and the aesthetics of disappearance.18 Each of these 
fields is witnessing the deployment of an interesting tactic, which 
involves appropriating former military techniques of screening, 
shielding, or protection and reactivating the tactical moment within 
military strategies, from the development of special colors and 
materials to electromagnetic jammers.
22 Reducing disconnection to a romanticized set of everyday practices 
of withdrawal would not only lose sight of this extremely produc-
tive space between tactics and strategies, it would also reaffirm the 
political fallacy that equates strategies with power and tactics with 
resistance. This kind of reading ultimately overlooks the existence 
of disconnection tactics that are inscribed into hegemonic calcu-
lations of power, such as the deployment of tactics of indifference 
to ignore unpopular individuals and discount entire social groups. 
Tactics intended to make oneself unavailable are never carried out 
in a social vacuum: There is an uneven distribution, for instance, 
of the ability to evade emails and withdraw from other communi-
cation demands, which in many companies remain the exclusive 
privilege of higher management (Jauréguiberry 2014).
The fact that the border between tactics and strategies functions as 
a critical space for the emergence of new techniques and technol-
ogies also shows that disconnection does not necessarily follow 
a technophobic impulse. Quite the contrary, we are witnessing 
the emergence of a rich variety of techniques and technologies of 
undoing networks, which reveal how many conditions underpin 
the possibility of disconnection. Once again, disconnection never 
comes about on its own and remains predicated on the ability to 
create social distance. When I speak of “undoing networks,” I mean 
precisely this intermediate area between tactics and strategies, 
which cannot be reduced to a mere disturbance, since it produces 
independent social forms.
Politics	of	Undoing	Networks
Adapting the polemological vocabulary of tactics and strategies 
to conceptualize undoing networks points to the fact that it can 
never be discussed in isolation from questions of power, and that 
it brings about a newly deviant politics of undoing networks. If the 
ethos of connectivity originally crystallized as a hegemonic principle 
in the network- shaped control society and was eventually inscribed 
into nearly every sociotechnical area, the ethos of (dis)connectivity 
23has recently become the scene of entirely new negotiations. 
Several years ago, the fast- food chain Burger King launched a con-
troversial campaign known as the “Whopper Sacrifice”: Anyone who 
“defriended” ten Facebook friends using a specially created app 
would receive one free Whopper (Wortham 2009). As for the for-
mer friends, the app would automatically notify them that they had 
been sacrificed for the cost of one- tenth of a burger. Ultimately, 
the advertising campaign had to be stopped prematurely because 
Facebook threatened to take legal action. Even if it was hardly 
intended to be a political campaign, the Whopper Sacrifice made 
visible the biopolitical order of social media companies and even 
challenged the seemingly self- evident notions that connections are 
desirable per se and that networking is always a matter of increas-
ing connectivity.19 In an almost classic manner, the politics of un-
doing networks remain centered on disrupting and denaturalizing 
the ethos of connectivity. Only in this way can we open our eyes to 
what it might mean— in a variation on Foucault’s well- known saying 
about being governed— to develop an “art of not being connected 
so much.” Accordingly, countless notions of the political that were 
originally concerned with emancipation have eventually wound 
up in a crisis, so long as they relied exclusively on visibility and 
recognition. In the end, is the radical democratic project of leftist 
populism nothing more than a massive hegemonic networking 
project? What would disconnection mean for the classic politics of 
visibility, such as various forms of identity politics that demand the 
recognition of previously unheard voices? Would disconnection 
amount to even greater exclusion or could forms of disconnection 
contribute to inclusion?
Even if the politics of undoing networks toil away at the heart of re-
ceived doctrines about connectivity, they are always subject to the 
threat of becoming depoliticized. Of course, the depoliticization of 
disconnection always follows a hidden political logic of responsibili-
zation. Framing disconnection as an individual practice of self- care 
makes isolated individuals appear to be responsible for moderating 
their own network contacts and for protecting their own privacy. 
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of control and loses its collective political relevance: the perceived 
inability to connect and disconnect, to network and de- network in 
the “right” way gets coded as a personal failing. At the same time, 
the transformation of disconnection into a social technology that 
is put in the service of perfect networking threatens to sacrifice 
its potential as a critique of the imperative to connect. To address 
this threat, we need to keep examining the fundamental concepts 
associated with undoing networks and conceive of the problem in 
terms of practices, technologies, and infrastructures, so as to avoid 
making the individual subject into the sine qua non of disconnec-
tion. A sociology of undoing networks needs to remain abstract 
in the sense that it focuses on the modulation of connections and 
is primarily interested in severing connections, fading them out, 
making them disappear, or letting them amount to nothing.
If there is more to undoing networks than the isolation of every-
day practices and the responsibilization of individuals, it might 
be found in the collective significance of disconnection for the 
networking process. In this respect, it does not suffice to simply 
diagnose the general network fever and criticize the imperative 
to network, since the same critique could also serve as a means 
of depoliticizing individuals. The “art of not being connected so 
much” is not a subjective project but a collective struggle, which 
plays out in networks around the limits of connectivity. In this 
respect, architecture theorist Malcolm McCullough (2013) speaks 
of “ambient commons,” a critical term for the political economy of 
attention and distraction in digital environments. Accordingly, we 
can revise the question of organizing attention— and with it, the 
proliferation and connectivity of information— into one of creating 
environments for collective experience. Only by detaching the 
experience of connectivity from an individualistic perspective can 
we hope to explore alternative possibilities of “ambient com-
moning” (Zehle 2014). The public treatment of disconnection will 
continue to create new zones of social conflict. While the contro-
versial “right to disconnect” (droit à la déconnexion) guarantees that 
25French workers do not need to be reachable in their free time,20 
the German Green Party is pushing for complete network coverage 
(ZEIT Online 2020), and the creation of 5G networks continues 
to escalate tensions between China and the United States. From 
debates about the right to disconnect to field- specific strategies like 
cell phone bans in schools, disconnection is increasingly becoming 
a political challenge, especially in terms of its institutionalization. 
Even more fiercely contested are attempts to disconnect parts of 
network topologies, such as the regulation of financial markets or 
the European Union’s controversial “link tax.” During the COVID- 19 
pandemic, social distancing and quarantine measures made clear 
that the control of disconnection is a highly contested terrain. It is 
even more apparent in these areas than in the desire for self- care 
and the longing for a life off the grid that undoing networks always 
comes down to power. In one of the few contributions to network 
theory that deals with the productive potential of disconnection, 
Marylin Strathern shows that cutting connections and limiting 
networks are extremely powerful gestures (Strathern 1996), 
which might find an ideal foundation of legitimacy in the growing 
thematization of hyperconnection. These kinds of disconnection 
strategies might have a sobering effect on critiques of the ethos 
of connectivity, insofar as they subordinate disconnectivity to the 
functional requirements of connectivity. But they also need to 
imagine moments of withdrawal and develop evasive techniques, 
which might help us reduce connectivity and strive for collective 
experiences of the disconnected life. In this respect, disconnection 
implicitly contains moments that suggest a way out of network 
fever. One of the most important tasks for disconnection tactics, 
as well as for their sociological analysis, consists in uncovering 
these socially fertile moments instead of focusing on individual tips 
and tricks for living without networks. By exposing the materiality 
of disconnection in its most controlled form, we might ultimately 
hope to reactivate the tactical moment inherent in strategies, even 
if this kind of undertaking remains embedded in a seemingly para-
doxical politics of visibility. Any sociology of undoing networks will 
thus oscillate between strategic formulations of what a life without 
26 networks might look like and open- ended tactics that derive the 
meaning of disconnecting from the ever- changing situation itself.
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networks, see, among others, Levine 2015, 112– 31; for the classic source on 
the emancipatory power of social media, Shirky 2011; for an overview of early 
political hopes in the internet, Papacharissi 2002.
 3 For a critique of sociological interactionism and a call for analysis of “minor 
modes,” see Jackson and Piette 2015.
 4 The following passages on the introvert are based on Urs Stäheli, “Die Angst 
vor der Gemeinschaft” (2013).
 5 For Simmel’s conception of indifference with the figure of nobility (Vornehm-
heit), which itself operates at the margins of sociology, see Simmel 2009, 
641– 65; for further analysis of the role of indifference in Simmel’s work, see 
Stäheli 2018.
 6 For a critical perspective, see Llamas and Belk 2013.
 7 For a critical perspective, see Sutton 2017; Stäheli and Stoltenberg 2020.
 8 For a historical overview, see Hesselberth 2018a.
 9 Especially prominent in danah boyd’s blog Apophenia (2004), which turns the 
pathological semantics of apophenia into a euphoric description of digital 
culture.
10 Compare discussions of increasing connectivity in organization theory (Kolb 
et al. 2012).
11 For a representative critique, see Feifer 2013.
12 For a feminist critique of the contemporary politics of withdrawal, see Sarah 
Sharma’s 2017 Marshall McLuhan Lecture, “Exit and the Extensions of Man,” 
summarized in Sharma 2017.
13 For the notion of a “practice- bound imaginary,” see Hyysalo 2006.
14 For Anderson, the printing press played a central role in constituting a national 
community.
15 See Luhmann’s (1984, 62) concept of connectivity (Anschlussfähigkeit); for a 
strong reading of disconnectivity in the sense of Anschlussunfähigkeit, see Bjerg 
(2006) and Stäheli (2020).
2716 On this topic, see the interview with Nicole Scheller in this volume.
17 For an overview of artistic projects with Faraday cages, see the “Feel Sound” 
blog: https://feelsoundproject-blog.tumblr.com. As early as 1973, the Canadian 
artist Tom Sherman created an aluminum Faraday cage, which provided a 
shield against any exterior radiation; of particular note are Catherine Richard’s 
“Curiosity Cabinet at the End of the Millennium” (1995) as well as Jan Sterbak’s 
“Oasis” (2000) and “Faradayyart” (2001).
18 From a prime example, see Hito Steyerl, “HOW NOT TO BE SEEN. A Fucking 
Didactic Educational .MOV file.” (Installation) (2013).
19 On the connection between biopolitics and connectivity, see Karppi 2018, 1462 
(Kindle Position).
20 For a critical take, see Hesselberth 2018b.
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Fashion designer Nicole Scheller studied applied arts in Schnee-
berg, Germany. She graduated in 2017 with her IP/privacy collec-
tion, which presented antisurveillance fashion. Since then, her work 
has focused on the question of how to make fashion an instrument 
for protecting the private sphere against digital surveillance, 
especially by using special materials. Scheller lives and works in 
Leipzig, Germany, where the following interview was conducted in 
January 2020.
lea p. zierott: How can clothing make someone 
disappear?
nicole scheller: Well, I decided to work with clothing 
in the first place because I’m a fashion designer. But 
when it comes down to it, surveillance cameras are re-
ally concerned with people’s identities. Algorithms, too, 
32 biometrics, are really about identity. Biometrics are essen-
tially patterns that translate someone’s identity into a sim-
ple mathematical form for an algorithm. On the basis of 
someone’s biometrics, an algorithm knows that they are X 
or Y, and now it knows what they look like. Fashion works 
exactly the same in some respects. We wear fashion or 
clothing to express ourselves, to transport our identities 
to the outside world. But fashion can also protect people 
from the outside world. It’s so effective because people 
can play a lot with shapes and forms. Large shapes, for 
instance, can conceal one’s gender. Size, weight— people 
can easily play with these categories by concealing their 
identifying features. Clothing is such a simple and effec-
tive way of protecting oneself against all this biometric 
data collection. It’s really the simplest path anyone could 
take.
As for the patterns, which are still in the development 
phase, they confuse algorithms even more about the 
surfaces of things. By producing meaningless data, people 
can make it even more difficult for algorithms to identify 
anyone at all. The first step is really about identification 
and only the second one is about analysis. Even in the 
first step, someone can already succeed in convincing an 
algorithm that they don’t count as a person— for instance, 
by totally scattering their external form. That’s a pretty 
good way of protecting oneself against surveillance, espe-
cially because most algorithms used for the initial recogni-
tion process operate in real time, which means they have 
to evaluate an enormous amount of data in a very short 
amount of time. That’s why the recognition process is very 
prone to errors and people can still react in time. Still, it’s 
always tilting at windmills. I only need to take a look at 
new developments and locate the sources of error and 
then I can go and try to find new solutions.
lz: So, people are still identified but as something else?
33ns: Anyone can make identification more difficult, so 
to speak. There’s a university in China, I think, that has 
developed another pattern like this one, which makes 
algorithms fail to recognize that the objects they’re ob-
serving are human beings.1 That would be the next step 
to take. I’m definitely not there yet. Everything is still in 
the test phase. Unfortunately, things aren’t so far along 
that someone could walk right past a surveillance cam-
era and not be identified at all. But anyone can make 
identification more difficult, and that’s good enough for 
now. You’ll either be falsely identified or you’ll produce 
meaningless data, which means even more data, which 
the algorithm might not be able to compute. The kind of 
data that doesn’t make any sense for identification, like a 
person with ten faces. It doesn’t make sense. It might fall 
through the cracks. But it falsifies the entire data set by 
producing meaningless information about external forms. 
Reflecting also plays a role in some surveillance systems, 
especially if they’re made up of 3D scanners, which is 
already quite common. They work with infrared light that 
people can easily confuse with reflectors. Those are some 
of the strategies I’ve found in my work so far, but I’m still 
working on them. We’ll see what happens next.
lz: How does the process of disappearing, or not being 
able to be identified, work? Is it a simple “yes- or- no”— you 
put something on and then you’re no longer identifiable? 
Or are there intermediate steps?
ns: As I was saying, anyone can always still be recognized 
as a human being. But I try to interfere with the process 
of identification, so that someone can really only be 
recognized as a human being and not as a particular per-
son. That’s one kind of intermediate step. Of course, I’m 
playing with biometrics and body shapes to make things 
really strange. This kind of estrangement is the focus of 
my collection.
34 lz: You named your label IP/privacy. Can you tell us how it 
came about and how you came up with the idea of mak-
ing this form of fashion in the first place?
ns: I didn’t want to simply take up the topic of surveillance 
and exclusively produce fashion. That’s not a challenge 
for me, personally. I like to find various ways of solving a 
problem. Whenever I identify a problem, I want to offer at 
least one potential solution, and that worked extremely 
well for this particular project and this particular subject. 
Of course, then I came across Adam Harvey and took a 
look at what was going on in that direction.2 At the time, 
there were already a couple of other artists. That was 
back in 2014, when everything started popping up out of 
the ground with the whole NSA scandal. When I was get-
ting started with my own work around three years later, I 
noticed that everything had gotten stuck. Things weren’t 
getting better. They were getting worse. And I thought, 
“Why aren’t you doing something about it anymore?”
lz: Your “way of solving a problem,” I mean your 
collection— What parts does it consist of and how do they 
work?
ns: The collection can be divided into two main catego-
ries. I approached everything from the bottom up. So first 
I looked at what kinds of surveillance systems there are, 
which ones are already being used, what can be found in 
urban spaces, and I started coming across infrared camer-
as, more in private usage. And then there were the auto-
mated face- recognition trials at the Südkreuz train station 
in Berlin, which are supposed to be expanded throughout 
the entire country. So, I looked at how they function. How 
does an algorithm identify someone’s face? What role do 
biometrics play? How does the recognition process work? 
What possibilities are there for face recognition and mo-
tion analysis?
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[Figure 2.1]. Nicole 
Scheller, IP/privacy, 
2017, black and 
white pattern. 
Photograph by Franz 
Grünewald; Christina 
Dalbert, model.
At first, I concentrated on face recognition and dealt a 
little with motion analysis. That resulted in the black- and- 
white knits— the three oversized pieces in the collection 
with an asymmetrical, black- and- white pattern. I deliber-
ately used asymmetry and the large size to conceal the 
shape of the body. It was the simplest way of doing it. The 
long and voluminous shapes cover up all the nodal points 
needed for motion analysis— knees, hips, arms— and that 
makes it more difficult. It’s not 100 percent perfect, it’s 
a way of creating some “obstacles” for motion analysis. 
Another thing that spurred me on was to avoid creating 
burkas, which would completely enclose the wearer.3 It 
was important for me to keep the face open and to make 
clothes that people could wear on the street. Of course, 
the pieces look very different when you first see them, 
but they work as streetwear. They’re wearable. They’ll 
36 definitely attract attraction but not from the cameras, and 
that’s the point.
The black- and- white pattern came out of my attempts to 
incorporate biometrics and analyze how they function. 
How does an algorithm recognize our faces, and what 
does the network it works with look like? I played around 
with it a little and developed this pattern. When an algo-
rithm scans the pattern, it’ll recognize something, which 
I then used to create duplicate faces. Thanks to the large 
number of faces and their positions, which together make 
up the black- and- white face pattern, the algorithm can no 
longer clearly say that this particular person is X or Y.
One piece in my collection is an oversized bomber jacket, 
which is intended to cover up the nodal points needed 
for motion analysis entirely. It goes down to the knees 
[Figure 2.2]. Nicole Scheller, 
IP/privacy, 2017, bomber 
jacket. Photograph by 
Franz Grünewald; Christina 
Dalbert, model.
37and makes whoever’s wearing it look like a great big egg. 
There’s also a slight hump in the back, which defragments 
the entire shape of the body. I didn’t use a pattern for any 
of it. I wanted to get back to the general idea of destroy-
ing the shape of the body and the question of how we can 
respond to motion analysis.
lz: And the main point of this material is that it takes on a 
shape of its own?
ns: That it holds its own shape as much as possible. 
I’m bad at using silk, it always collapses on me, which is 
why I’m always on the search for fabrics that retain their 
shape. That’s also behind my choice of contrasting colors, 
which was hardly random. The algorithm looks for ex-
treme contrasts, which is why a black- and- white pattern 
is good at preventing someone from being recognized. I 
ended up sticking with these two colors, black and white.
There’s another oversized bomber jacket, which I also 
used for the cut of the white jacket (see Figure 2.2). It’s 
made out of a different fabric but it’s still a knit that holds 
its shape well, and there’s another nice hump in the back, 
which also holds its shape relatively well. And here, of 
course, there’s another oversized sweater.
I also designed a dress where the pattern worked pretty 
well. I took a video with it hanging on the dress form, 
which shows how the algorithm tries to recognize faces 
even in the straps.
lz: So if someone wears this dress and steps in front of a 
surveillance camera, it wouldn’t only see one face, it’d see 
ten faces?
ns: Exactly, that was the idea, at least. That’s why it was 
important for me to keep the face visible but at the same 
time to produce meaningless data that would make any 
clear identification more difficult. Somehow, seeing a per-
son with ten faces doesn’t make sense to the algorithm. 
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There must be an error and everything would theoreti-
cally need to be analyzed again, but by that point you’re 
already long gone. So, the point is to produce errors as 
quickly and effectively as possible, in real time— right in 
the real- time scan, as it were— so that you won’t be recog-
nized. It worked really well with this pattern, I even tested 
it out with different sizes. In some cases, the pattern ends 
up getting divided into even smaller sections, which cre-
ates even more faces.
lz: It really is a stylish pattern. At least, I don’t think it’d 
be that weird to wear it. It’s a little like houndstooth, don’t 
you think?
[Figure 2.3]. Nicole 
Scheller, IP/privacy, 
2017, sweater. Photo-
graph by Franz Grüne-
wald; Christina Dalbert, 
model.
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[Figure 2.4]. Nicole 
Scheller, IP/privacy, 
2017, coat. Photograph 
by Franz Grünewald; 
Christina Dalbert, 
model.
ns: Yes, definitely. That would be one face the camera 
would recognize. Add to that your own face and then 
there would be two faces, which confuses the algorithm. 
The numbers in the pattern were originally part of the 
programming process. But I only kept them in for aesthet-
ic reasons. Because they were related to programming, 
I thought, “Come on, just leave it in! Someone will think 
that something is off here; it must mean something!”
That was the one piece. The other one was actually just 
a coat where I integrated LEDs into the hood to create a 
sort of “fade effect” for infrared or night- vision cameras. 
Now, the way the effect works isn’t exactly that someone 
can just walk down the street and literally light up like a 
lightbulb. The fade occurs beyond our visual spectrum 
and can only be seen by the camera. The piece also has a 
special IRR coating, which is normally used in the military. 
It’s especially confusing for thermal- imaging cameras, 
40 since it keeps all of your body heat inside. You’re practi-
cally invisible, or only visible as a smudge in the image. It’s 
used less in urban spaces. But it was still a great fit be-
cause I was dealing with infrared. You switch on the LEDs 
in the hood before you get going.
lz: And they light up all around your head?
ns: Precisely. The hood itself is very large, as is the neck-
line. You can’t recognize anyone’s face, no matter what 
perspective you look at it from. I tested it out with video 
recordings, and it works great from the front and the side. 
Nobody can see anything, since the wearer is completely 
illuminated.
The angle of the LEDs and the wavelength of light are 
designed in a way that they completely blind the infrared 
camera. An infrared camera needs light to see in the dark, 
and the LEDs simply send this light right back to it. That’s 
what created the idea of reflecting, as well as this bright 
glow. Once again, it’s in the coating. It’s a really tough 
material, which doesn’t let any body heat pass through to 
the outside, and that ensures that people aren’t seen by 
drones. Unfortunately, I haven’t had the chance to test it 
out with a thermal camera yet, though I’d love to see the 
results.
lz: But wouldn’t you also have to make sure that no body 
heat escapes through the zipper or the seams?
ns: Theoretically, I would have had to make a whole suit. 
In my coat, you can see the wearer’s hands, because it 
was designed for an urban space. Otherwise, you’d sweat 
like a pig in it, since the material is so tough. That’s why I 
made it as large as possible, so that even the sleeves are a 
little more open. Otherwise, you’d really sweat like a dog. 
Those are the kinds of things you only ever notice during 
the initial development. I did everything in half a year, 
including the technical development, the materials, and 
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Figure 2.5. Nicole Scheller, 
IP/privacy, 2017, visor. 
Photograph by Franz 
Grünewald; Christina 
Dalbert, model.
the cuts. Nothing else was possible for the time being. Of 
course, these are the kinds of things you need to keep on 
your radar for future development, or else it won’t work. 
Nobody will wear it.
Then there are the basics, which I sewed for people to 
wear under the collection, to preserve the asymmetry. 
There are bumps here too. I also designed a kind of visor 
that you can wear like a cap. It doesn’t let in any infrared 
light, and your face looks like a dark disk— you’re unrecog-
nizable. Then there are leggings with “chub- knees”— that’s 
what I like to call them because they make your knees 
look chubby but in a good way. Of course, I’m often just 
playing around. But I’m serious about asymmetry and the 
potential defragmentation of the human body, ideas that 
inform my entire collection.
42 After the collection, I also started a small line of antisur-
veillance products like this bag. You can stick your cell 
phone and credit cards inside and be completely offline. I 
called the line of products “[off ’lain].” They’re bonus gad-
gets for the collection, little things to let people decide for 
themselves when to be offline.
What makes it work is a particular material made of 
metal threads that gets incorporated into the lining. It’s 
like you’re putting your cellphone inside a lead box or an 
aluminum refrigerator. You’re offline. Theoretically, you 
could just put your phone in the fridge, that works too.
lz: The bag is really stylish though . . . 
ns: It has to be— otherwise, nobody would want it. That’s 
exactly my approach. I noticed that words like “informa-
tion privacy” and “the private sphere” sounded dusty and 
seemed like they’re none of anybody’s business. That’s 
why people can respond to surveillance so well with fash-
ion, or at least I’m trying to. By making these words carry 
more weight, I’m trying to create a new discourse. What 
I’m trying to say is, “It’s cool again, we can talk about it, 
everyone can do something about it, everyone can spread 
the message and look good doing it.”
lz: What about the hat? Is it also for antisurveillance pur-
poses?
ns: It’s a special hat, still a prototype like everything else. 
It’ll also involve the visor concept, but I’m still working on 
the mechanics. These are all new ideas of things to come. 
The main point is to protect people’s identities. When it 
comes to evading surveillance, nobody has a real choice. 
If someone puts up a surveillance camera, there’s really 
nothing anybody else can do about it. You can respond 
with your choice of clothing, maybe put on a hoodie or 
something. But in the end, there’s not much else you 
can do to protect your identity. You’re going to be filmed 
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When it comes to biometrics, we’re an open book. It’s all 
really shady. If you’re being evaluated all the time, like 
with the rewards and punishments in China’s social credit 
system, and you happen to run a red light with a traffic 
camera, then wham— minus ten points! Today, it’s no 
longer Orwell, it’s the real world.
lz: Would you describe your fashion as unisex, or does it 
matter who wears it?
ns: Theoretically, it’s all tailored in a particular way. The 
cuts are all very wide, or they don’t really have anything to 
do with a normal cut. But for menswear, I’d have to make 
everything a little larger, because people are built differ-
ently. My larger ambition is to make two lines, or maybe 
just one line, but it’s definitely gender- neutral. Anyone can 
wear it. In terms of customer demand, those looking for 
menswear tend to prefer the coat, those looking for  
womenswear the black- and- white pattern. But different 
people think different things are cool. I get the craziest 
requests.
lz: And now you’re getting a lot of requests, since people 
can see photos of the clothes on your website?
ns: That’s for sure. I recently got a request from one guy 
who thought the black- and- white pattern was really cool 
and wanted to have it on a suit blazer. It’s a good idea, but 
I’m not that far along yet.
lz: Does that mean you’re still in development, or are 
your clothes already being worn on the street?
ns: Well, I’ve been tinkering around for most of the past 
year with making the cellphone bag into a product. I even 
sold a couple of prototypes. But everything is still in the 
development phase, even the clothes. And I definitely 
won’t get very far working on my own. I lack the tech-
nical know- how to be able to say, “Now, I’m going to do 
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on other people to help me out. It would be nice to have 
a team with a computer programmer and someone who 
does business management and keep working from 
there. That’s why it took me a while to get everything up 
and running to the point where it could really take off.
One of my goals is to make sure that the entire collection 
can function as streetwear in everyday situations. If the 
collection gets put in an exhibition or a museum, it’ll just 
sit there, and it won’t help anyone. Sure, it might stimu-
late the discourse. But I really want to help people help 
themselves. Like I said, everyone should be able to make 
their own decisions and do something for themselves, for 
the private sphere, because that’s precisely what’s being 
subject to more and more restrictions. It was important 
for me to really get to the bottom of this point.
lz: Would the computer programmer in your hypothetical 
team be the one responsible for making sure that the 
algorithms work, then?
ns: Sure. By now, I have a basic understanding of algo-
rithms, I really have to. But I definitely can’t get that deep 
into the material, so the programmer could do that work 
for me. Of course, they would also have to see what’s 
possible. They couldn’t do everything on their own either. 
We’d probably need a whole technical team to disassem-
ble the algorithms. To pull off anything truly great, I’m 
dependent on others. I’d be happy to have a team.
lz: But your main task would be translating everything 
into the material or the clothing?
ns: Sure. There would need to be at least three different 
areas of development, and I would need to “translate,” 
as you put it, so that everything works and can be imple-
mented. We’ll see.
lz: When you say that it takes a year to make something 
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ly are you doing?
ns: Above all, I’m relying on my materials. It’s not the case 
that I can simply pick up a silk fabric and work with it. I 
need to inspect my materials very closely to discover their 
abilities. I’ve done lots of tests with the metal weave, for 
instance, which has worked the best so far for making 
fasteners. It’s a simple product, but it wasn’t easy to make 
it truly shielded and in a way that’s also easy for the end 
user. That was the crux of the whole thing, and so there’s 
a lot of trial and error in these products.
lz: What does one of your trials look like, then, say, with 
the jacket?
ns: Put it on, try it out, look at the algorithm, get it 
scanned. The jacket basically works but not to the point 
where someone could just go to the Südkreuz train sta-
tion and not be recognized. It’s definitely not there yet. 
But I’ve found the approach I’d like to keep pursuing. I’ve 
gotten a hell of a lot of requests from people who really 
want to buy the clothes. But I’m not really ready to sell 
them yet. Sure, someone could wear one of the pieces as 
a fashion statement. But for me, the real point of wearing 
them is to be almost invisible, and that needs to work 
really well. I want to take my time and think everything 
through, so everyone will just have to wait.
lz: Could you describe your search for materials? How do 
you come up with something?
ns: Research. You can always find something in military 
technology. Shielding products are one small sector that’s 
been around for ages, with offices, for instance, where 
sensitive data or electronic parts get stored in certain 
rooms. So, you can look and see where something like 
that already exists, and then instead of just thinking that 
it’s strange, you can use it in a strange way. Something 
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simple. Identifying the problem and the appropriate ma-
terials, and then looking around and testing things out. 
I like to order various materials, try them out, and see 
whether or not they work.
lz: And then the material needs to be workable . . . 
ns: Exactly, like with the coat. It’s a Cordura fabric with 
IRR coating, a really strong material. Today, I would nev-
er even work with it, because it’s too stiff, like backpack 
material, and it’s not comfortable for everyday use. At 
one point in time, it was a good solution, but it no longer 
works for the end user. Those are the kinds of things 
I have in mind for the next developments, what could 
work better. How do people make things with LEDs, for 
instance? It’s a completely new field for me, which LEDs 
to use, whether they’re washable, these kinds of things. 
They’re very important, especially if you want to sell a 
piece. It’s all still just one big experiment that’s only start-
ing to get exciting.
lz: You also work with this particular shade of black . . . 
ns: Vantablack. I came across it at one point or another; it 
was another research project. It’s practically the blackest 
black there is.4 Because it absorbs light completely, so to 
speak. It’s a carbon color, which means that you can think 
of it like a forest— any light that falls on the forest will get 
swallowed up.5 It’s really dark there, and the structure of 
the color is similar. I found it really exciting, but the main 
problem is that it’s not really durable. It doesn’t last for 
very long after you apply it, and you can’t just apply it 
anywhere, since it can be wiped off afterwards. That’s why 
it’s not yet practical for me. I’m excited to see what kinds 
of developments there will be as the years go by. I don’t 
have time for it at the moment, it’s another completely 
different field that has taken years to get to this point. The 
possibility of using it for something else, like a varnish or 
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exciting, and I’d definitely have a few pieces ready to go.
lz: What kinds of things has Vantablack been used for up 
to now?
ns: Good question. I don’t know whether it was devel-
oped by NASA or someone else. The only thing I know is 
that there’s a company that copied it, because up to now 
anyone who wanted to use this blackest black needed a 
license for it.
Of course, the license costs a hell of a lot of money, 
which created a countermovement of people saying, “We 
want to use this shade of black and we’re going to do 
our own research.” They actually even developed a color 
and brought it to market. It’s intended more for artists 
and painters and other creative types. But even this new 
shade of black is still washable. So, it’s not really durable 
and not really useful for me yet. But I’d love to make 
something with it, if only it would last a little longer, that 
would be really cool. Like I said, let’s wait and see what 
happens.
Again, I’m very reliant on my materials. I can’t just say, 
“I’ve got an idea, I’d like to implement it now.” These are 
fields where people have been doing research for years! 
That’s why I have to see what’s available on the market 
and how I can use it for my own purposes.
lz: How did you manage to get the anti– face recognition 
pattern with all the faces on it into the fabric?
ns: That’s the cool thing about biometrics— you can do a 
lot with surface design. It doesn’t really matter what kind 
of material you’re working with. The main point is that 
the algorithm recognizes it. And as soon as that happens, 
it works. As a designer, you can indulge yourself, which 
I personally find to be pretty great. That my work as a 
designer doesn’t depend on the material for once— which 
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bility of playing with the design without thinking about the 
material, that’s a really nice change for me.
lz: Does surface design mean that you still make the 
fabrics yourself?
ns: Well, in part. Like I said, I knitted the pattern into the 
knit piece. I didn’t dye it, I knitted directly into it. That’s 
why it’s permanently integrated and works well right from 
the start. The algorithm recognizes it, anyway, and that’s a 
pretty good first step.
lz: Do you have the sense that antisurveillance clothing, 
or clothing for disconnection, is a topic in the fashion 
world right now?
ns: Phew! It’s not, not at all. Well, at most with these RFID- 
blocking products. I think there was a Hugo Boss suit at 
some point with a little breast pocket with an RFID- blocker 
inside it, for credit cards and stuff like that. That was the 
only thing people were going on about for a little while. In 
the past few years, I’ve seen lots of RFID blocking wallets. 
But the problem is that most of them are made with bad 
materials. They only last two weeks and then they fall 
apart. Or, you end up washing them, and then they’re 
toast. The people who make these things aren’t thinking 
about whether they’ll really work in the long term.
As for disconnection or the private sphere, I haven’t per-
sonally heard of many attempts to really address these 
topics, and if so, then only in small circles of artists. It 
takes a lot of courage to deal with these things, and 
they’re still hot topics for big labels and large companies. 
They’re politically loaded, and the businesses usually ar-
en’t up for it. They stick to the motto: “Keep everything as 
neat as possible. Just do fashion, and that’s enough.” Well, 
it’s not enough for me.
lz: Apart from clothing you’re also working with body 
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your work?
ns: My main concern is clothing. Adam Harvey did some-
thing similar with painting,6 so it was really just a little nod 
to his work because it went well with fashion. At the end 
of the day, I’m spending most of my time on biometrics, 
which naturally includes the face. It’s a massive undertak-
ing to deal with the whole pattern, but my own work ulti-
mately keeps going in the direction of fashion. My clothes 
are already extreme. It would be too much for someone 
to wear something else on their face, like makeup. No-
body would do it. Well, nobody would do it seriously. May-
be at a rave or something, but not in everyday life.
lz: Would you say then that your main design concept is 
about making sure that the clothes are wearable?
ns: Definitely. You could even say, “form follows function,” 
because I have to get my bearings from two extreme 
directions, from the end user, the wearer, and from the 
[surveillance] systems. Everything needs to be based on 
how the cameras work, how they see someone, and I 
have to adapt my design in that direction. That’s why I’m 
always trying to find out what the problem really is and 
how we might respond to it. That’s the entire content of 
my work. Really, I’m a problem solver, at least I’m always 
looking for potential solutions.
lz: Let me conclude then by thanking you very much for 
this interesting conversation.
Notes
 1 For further details on the “invisibility cloak” project, which actually resulted 
from a collaboration between Tsinghua University and the University of Wash-
ington, see Yang et al. 2018.
 2 In 2013, Berlin- based artist and researcher Adam Harvey brought out his 
Stealth Wear collection, which consisted of antidrone fashion. Harvey’s CV 
50 Dazzle collection also deals with antisurveillance products and camouflage 
techniques. See Harvey’s website, https://ahprojects.com/.
 3 Scheller appears to be contrasting her work again with Harvey’s Stealth Wear 
collection, which was “inspired by traditional Islamic dress and the idea that 
garments can provide a separation between man and God” (Harvey 2012).
 4 On Vantablack, which was developed by Surrey NanoSystems, see the 
company’s website, https://www.surreynanosystems.com/about/vantablack. 
On the reception of one artist’s attempt to patent the color, see “Black 3.0:  
Anish Kapoor and the Art World’s Pettiest, Funniest Dispute,” The Guardian, 
August 5, 2019.
 5 See the entry for “Forest” in the Glossary of this volume.
 6 In his CV Dazzle collection, Harvey uses a facial camouflage technique inspired 
by the naval camouflage developed during the First World War and colloquially 
known as “razzle dazzle”; see the revised 2020 version of Harvey’s collection, 
updated a decade after the original collection, https://cvdazzle.com/.
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I was recently online on my computer when I noticed 
that the ads on the sides of the screen were for Ashley 
Madison. I do not think my husband is cheating, I really 
don’t, but I still get that jealous pang in my chest when 
this happens. Is it possible that those ads are showing up 
because of websites I visit? . . . So, am I just in denial? Or is 
it possible these ads are my fault, and if so, is there a way 
to stop them from showing up?
When a concerned Internet user posed these questions to Slate’s 
sex advice column, columnist Rich Juzwiak (2019) emphasized the 
irony of turning the site into a “very basic tech advice column.” 
Underscoring his lack of technical experience, Juzwiak came 
immediately to a larger conclusion: “It is true that sometimes 
previous visits to a website could result in targeted ads for that 
site, but that’s not the only thing generating such content,” Juzwiak 
answers. Targeting potential customers, he continues, “is a fuzzy 
science, and major screw- ups have occurred in this very realm. 
It was recently reported that ads for Ashley Madison appeared 
on multiple children’s sites.” Juzwiak’s answer indicates that ads 
52 for a dating site once marketed primarily to users looking for 
extramarital affairs are not necessarily connected to having a 
profile on Ashley Madison or even visiting that particular website. 
Rather, the ads result from more abstract demographic targeting 
of potential customers. For anyone familiar with how targeted 
advertising works in the social media age, this method is nothing 
new. Users are constantly placed in cookie- cutter audiences based 
on their age, location, and occupation; visitors are bombarded with 
tailored ads based on not only the websites they frequent but also 
those of their presumed peers. What is new, as Juzwiak’s response 
notes, is that major social platforms such as Twitter and Facebook 
have begun to offer users the ability to “opt- out” of personalized 
targeted marketing. In other words, users can now block the  
flow of information among Ashley Madison, Facebook, Google, 
and similar sites, thereby reducing the chances of receiving 
unwanted ads and perhaps calming those with suspicious minds. 
These opt- out capabilities are not designed exclusively for those 
with something to hide but for everyone who wants to have more 
control over the ads they see when they use social platforms.
In this chapter, I will focus specifically on Facebook’s Off- Facebook 
Activity tool (Facebook A). This tool, which the company rolled out 
on August 20, 2019, can be contextualized as Facebook’s solution 
to the aforementioned problem of social media connectivity 
brought about by personalized targeted advertising. When users 
are connected to Facebook’s highly intensive algorithmic structure, 
the data generated from their heterogenous online activities 
become the means for identifying, profiling, and targeting them 
regardless of their wishes. In the past few years, this problem has 
received increased media attention, exemplified by the high- profile 
case of Cambridge Analytica and its psychographic profiling and 
targeting of voters based on Facebook data. The possibility to 
disconnect some of the data streams used for targeting now 
becomes part of the user’s “Facebook experience” (Facebook B). 
The tool, which one can access from one’s Facebook settings, gives 
a “summary of your [user] activity that we [Facebook] receive 
53from businesses or organizations, which includes your activity on 
other apps and websites” (Facebook C). This information is used by 
Facebook to “show more relevant ads”; suggest things that could 
interest the users such as events, Marketplace items, and groups; 
help the user to find new businesses and brands and help the 
latter to understand “how their website, app or ads are performing 
and whether they’re reaching the right people”; and to identify 
“suspicious activity” (Facebook C). With the tool you can not only 
review a summary of your past Off- Facebook Activity but also “You 
can disconnect your past off- Facebook activity from your account 
with the clear history control in your off- Facebook activity setting,” 
Facebook (B) tells us.
According to the prevailing logic, the perceived problem (connectiv-
ity) and its standard solution (disconnection) are seen as binary op-
posites. The empirical and conceptual analysis of the Off- Facebook 
Activity tool in this chapter is intended to argue that this relation 
is productive rather than disruptive. Seeing the relation between 
connection and disconnection as productive refers to what Pepita 
Hesselberth (2018) calls the “structuring paradox” of disconnection: 
there is no connectivity without disconnectivity. My analysis will 
build on Hesselberth’s view of disconnection as a process that 
does not negate connectivity but gives rise to an outside that is 
immanently present (2018, 2007). The constitution of the outside 
is at the heart of my reading of the Off- Facebook Activity tool, 
which designates the outside with a specific name: “off- Facebook.” 
I claim that this term denotes a particular mode of exteriority 
defined by the company and manifest in how the tool works and is 
contextualized. The argument I develop in this chapter is that the 
Off- Facebook Activity tool implies Facebook’s incapability to think 
above and beyond the dominant images of current connectivity— 
the relation they have themselves effectively constructed, where 
connections that contribute data for the company are essential for 
its financial survival.
In the following, I map out how the Off- Facebook Activity tool 
is said to “undo” the links between the platform, its users, and 
54 advertisers. The slogan for the Off- Facebook Activity tool is “You 
see it. You control it,” which emphasizes that while the platform 
offers the tools, privacy is a user choice (Facebook L). Focusing on 
the problematics of choice, and following Deepti Singh Apte’s lead, 
I will use nudge theory to discuss the tool as a choice architecture 
that gives users an explicit sense of autonomy by providing them 
with control over their privacy settings while still subjecting them 
to an environment where other modes of control operate, often 
beyond users’ awareness (Apte 2020). In my reading the control 
over privacy settings is privacy controlled by the company, and 
the definition of off- Facebook activity is an attempt to redraw the 
boundaries of connectivity.
My main sources for the analysis are the promotional videos, 
which introduces the Off- Facebook Activity tool, and which in my 
reading influence user behavior and direct users toward certain 
practices instead of others. I will analyze four videos included in 
the tool’s promotional website (Facebook A): “Meera Introduces 
Our New Data Control to Her Husband” (Facebook D), “Introducing 
Off- Facebook Activity: A New Tool That Gives You More Control of 
Your Data” (Facebook L), “Why Do Ads Feel Like They Are Directed 
to You, Personally?” (Facebook J), and “Where Online Advertising 
is Headed” (Facebook K).1 All together, the materials for close 
reading in this chapter consist of the platform’s official promotional 
materials, help- center documents that describe the tool or the 
company’s definition of off- Facebook activity, and other Facebook 
materials that describe how ad targeting works (Facebook A– L). As 
I will show, the discourses of the Off- Facebook Activity tool nudge 
users to evaluate their choice to disconnect in terms of gains and 
losses, often encouraging them to keep using the system rather 
than abandon it. In the end, I argue that we should pay attention 
to the ways in which the outside is constituted and imagined in the 
discourses of disconnection.
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Incidentally, “Meera Introduces Our New Data Control to Her 
Husband” is the name of a video (Facebook D) Facebook uses to 
promote its opt- out tool “Off- Facebook Activity” and it features 
a happy couple.2 In this video, Meera from Facebook’s Data and 
Privacy Team shows her husband David the platform’s new data 
controls. “We just released a control that gives people the ability to 
view a summary of their off- Facebook activity and disconnect that 
from their account,” Meera explains to David. The couple conduct 
the interview at Facebook headquarters, where soft light flows 
through the translucent windows at the back of the scene. “What’s 
Facebook activity?” David asks. Meera explains that it consists of 
information about users’ interactions, including app usage and 
website visits. David asks further whether Facebook sends his 
name and phone number to websites after receiving indications 
of interactions. “No,” Meera answers, firmly shaking her head. “We 
can show you ads without telling advertisers who you are.” David 
asks for an example, and Meera illustrates how clicking and brows-
ing on a backpack website creates a piece of data showing that 
a user on device X clicked on an image of a particular backpack. 
To illustrate this point, they discuss the process of shopping for a 
backpack, which is illustrated with animations of imaginary compa-
nies and simplified data flows. If any user clicks on any links on an 
affiliated shopping website, that device data will be relayed back to 
Facebook, matched to its own user database, and used to serve up 
a targeted ad. “Okay, and now, I can disconnect that if I want to,” 
David says hesitantly. Meera asks for his phone, and an overlaid 
animation shows her accessing a scrollable off- Facebook activity 
list of 215 imaginary apps and websites that have shared David’s 
activity with the company. “That’s why I see all these backpack ads,” 
the enlightened David deduces. “So, if I disconnect this, do [sic] I not 
see ads anymore?” Meera clarifies, “You’ll still see the same number 
of ads. They’re just gonna be less personalized.” “That makes 
sense,” rejoices David as Meera announces “more transparency 
and control updates to come.”
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Off- Facebook Activity tool. “The best person to be in control of 
data is you,” the press release for the Off- Facebook Activity tool 
declares (Facebook A). The tool’s documents and videos claim, 
both implicitly and explicitly, that users are the best persons to 
control their data, and that the Off- Facebook Activity tool gives 
them the means to do so. Emphasizing user control and placing 
the burden of responsibility on individuals is hardly new. As Siva 
Vaidhyanathan points out, it has become a “standard position . . . 
of Silicon Valley companies that monitor our behavior and record 
our transactions” (Vaidhyanathan 2018, 74). Central to Facebook’s 
idea of control is the idea that users have a choice to manage their 
privacy online. In its emphasis on choice, the Off- Facebook Activity 
tool also belongs to a longer history of privacy tools, which have 
been designed to give users more control over the leakiness of 
online connectivity (Chun 2016). Ever since the 1990s, the makers 
of these tools have envisioned privacy, as Nora Draper (2019, 87) 
notes, as “a function of personal choice optimized through tools 
that enable control.” The Off- Facebook Activity tool belongs to a ge-
nealogy of tools that emphasize individuals’ choice to protect their 
personal data in information systems, for example, by hiding their 
IP addresses and letting them surf the web in stealth mode (51– 52). 
Draper underscores the importance of enabling choice as a function 
of situation- specific protection: a “user participating in a chat room, 
for example, might prefer to use a consistent pseudonymous 
persona. . . . That same individual, however, may prefer complete 
anonymity when visiting news sites or browsing for health- related 
information” (54).
Enabling the choice for privacy does not, however, solely solve 
what has been called the privacy paradox: that individuals are 
aware of privacy issues and yet choose to act against their best 
knowledge (Kokolakis 2017). Behavioral economists have claimed 
that how we evaluate the worth of privacy online depends on 
psychological biases such as a state of loss aversion (Acquisti, John, 
and Loewenstein 2013). Loss aversion holds that, for individuals, 
57“losses are weighted substantially more than objectively com-
mensurate gains” (Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990, 1326). 
Research on loss aversion has indicated that individuals tend to 
overvalue the things in their possession; for example, what one 
person is willing to pay for a good is less than what they are willing 
to accept when they sell it.3 This behavior is not rational yet is 
constitutive to the decision- making process.
Ideas like loss aversion become important to the emergence of the 
field of nudge theory.4 In their book Nudge (2008), Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein claim that human behavior is not as rational 
as economists have proposed throughout the history of the field. 
The directing thought behind nudge theory is that human behavior 
cannot be controlled by relying on rationality in decision- making 
situations and thus people need to be “nudged” toward certain 
behaviors. Nudge theory is connected to an ideology Thaler and 
Sunstein define as “libertarian paternalism,” which pushes people 
to make certain choices in given situations without coercion (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2003). This ideology presupposes an authority who 
knows what is best for individuals and groups, and promotes 
those behaviors through subtle nudges. The Social and Behavioral 
Science team of the Obama administration was probably the 
most famous example of the practical applications of this theory. 
Moreover, “Nudge- style forms of governance have been employed 
most commonly in North America and Western Europe to address 
lifestyle issues linked to diet, exercise and smoking, financial prac-
tices related to saving and investment, and ‘anti- social’ behavior 
such as loitering and speeding,” Carolyn Pedwell observes (2017, 
60). The aims of nudges are often to break bad habits, promote 
healthier lifestyles, and generally improve people’s lives (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008; Pedwell 2017; Mannevuo 2019).
One specific area of social media to which nudge theory has 
already been applied is the aforementioned context of privacy 
(Wang et al. 2014, 2367). Alessandro Acquisti (2009), for example, 
asserts that systems can be designed to “enhance and influence” 
users’ privacy choices. By exposing and exploiting psychological 
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decisions. While in this context nudging can be justified with the 
importance of more informed choices that protect privacy, it is 
clear that this technique can be applied to other purposes as well. 
To exemplify nudges, Thaler and Sunstein mention the practices of 
“collaborative filtering,” which is used to provide recommendations 
for books, films, and other products on the basis of an individual’s 
tastes and preferences, as well as their degree of likeness to other 
individuals (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 96). As is now apparent,  
this method has been perfected in the recommender systems 
used not only on Netflix but also on social media platforms like 
Facebook, which use complex algorithmic processes to evaluate 
different options and personalize them for every user.5 It is also  
no surprise that these new capabilities for better and more 
individual targeting have brought huge changes to the advertise-
ment industry. As examined by Joseph Turow, in the current digital 
landscape Facebook has a significant role in giving advertisers the 
capability to better target advertisements based on things like 
online behaviors, past purchases, and locational data (Turow  
2011). As Turow notes, Facebook has become one of the central 
gatekeepers of this information, and advertisers’ access to the 
information relies on the use of Facebook’s advertising tools, 
which are not free (Turow 2011, 138). In 2019 the total revenue of 
Facebook was $70,697 million, of which advertising revenue was 
$69,655 million (Facebook E). Advertising is Facebook’s key source 
of revenue.
“Nudge is a curious mechanism, for it both presupposes and 
pushes against freedom; it assumes a choosing subject, but one 
who is constitutionally ill equipped to make rational, healthy 
choices,” Natasha Dow Schüll and Caitlin Zaloom (2011, 523) write. 
Of course, not all work that describes nudge- like practices should 
be mapped out through nudge theory; online manipulation and 
persuasion, for example, constitute their own specific cases, 
which are slightly different than “nudging” (Susser, Roessler, and 
Nissenbaum 2019). Yet, the software- based capability to steer 
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digital environments plays well into its framework. Control of 
choice in nudge theory is premised on the capability to modify the 
environments in which choices take place. One of Thaler and Sun-
stein’s examples involves a school cafeteria where fruit is placed 
in front of dessert to encourage consumption of healthy apples 
instead of less healthy sponge cakes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 
1– 3, 10). The authors maintain that this situation coerces no one to 
make any particular selection, but the placement of goods within 
the cafeteria makes certain choices easier than others. Apte, when 
analyzing Facebook as a choice architecture, reminds us that there 
are methods of nudging more refined than just placing things in 
certain order within the interface: her examples range from social 
nudges to algorithm- based hypernudges— in the former, users’ 
Newsfeed posts influence others through network effects, and in 
the latter, recommendation algorithms select nudges based on, for 
example, predictive modeling (Apte 2020, 6; Yeung 2017). What is 
also important to Apte and, for example, Karen Yeung (2017), who 
writes about hypernudges, is that some nudges induce passive 
behaviors while others activate them. In the following section, I will 
explore the nudges of the Off- Facebook Activity tool by examining 
how it is introduced as part of the Facebook interface and how it 
is positioned within its environment. Central here is the notion of 
“default” and how Facebook’s settings enable the choice of certain 
selections instead of others.
Defaults
As described in the instructional video featuring Meera and David, 
the Off- Facebook Activity tool lets users see a summary of the 
apps and websites that by default are allowed to send Facebook 
information about their activity (Facebook D). If users so choose, 
they can clear this information from their accounts. First, they must 
access their Facebook settings, and then click on “Off- Facebook Ac-
tivity,” which will present options to “Manage your Facebook Activi-
ty” or “Clear History” (Facebook D). The “Manage” option provides a 
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tool offers a clean list- based interface where the user chooses to 
either remove off- Facebook activity partly by individually selecting 
which website and app is given access or clearing the entire off- 
Facebook history with one button. If users choose to turn off future 
activity, this selection will be activated within 48 hours and their 
past activity will also be erased (Facebook F). By clicking the individ-
ual selection, such as the hypothetical Tom’s Backpacks, the user 
enters a page that gives general details about how Facebook has 
received this information and the number of interactions received. 
The user can then choose to go to the advertiser’s website, discon-
nect the link between that particular off- Facebook website, or give 
feedback about the reported activity.
The tool’s functionality is based on what nudge theorists call 
“choice architecture” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 3), whereby indi-
viduals are also assigned a default position and “digital decision- 
guidance processes” inform their default settings (Yeung 2017, 
121).6 By default the off- Facebook activity is not blocked. According 
to nudge theory, defaults are particular nudges that take place 
in moments when what happens below the threshold of user’s 
awareness becomes amplified. In these moments, defaults guide 
our choices. Far beyond software operations, defaults represent 
a widespread cultural phenomenon. Eric Johnson and Daniel 
Goldstein discuss the impact of defaults on medicine and organ 
donation, where making the default to opt in or opt out significant-
ly affects the number of donations (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). 
Another classic example from behavioral economics is the default 
to opt in or out of a retirement plan (Choi et al. 2004). Defaults 
may enable choices but they also indicate that certain choices are 
privileged over others (Shah and Kesan 2008, 990). According to 
Johnson and Goldstein, defaults can influence choices in three 
ways: they imply a recommended action; they reduce the effort 
needed in decision making; and they “often represent the existing 
state or status quo, and change usually involves a trade- off” 
(Johnson and Goldstein 2003, 1338).
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decision- making process without forcing the user to choose (Thal-
er, Sunstein, and Balz 2013, 431). The choice to do nothing is to 
choose the default. Important here is that choosing to do nothing 
seems to be the users’ default state. For example, Rajiv Shah and 
Christian Sandvig’s research shows that when users configure their 
Wi- Fi settings most do not change their default settings at all (2008, 
41). “For reasons of laziness, fear, and distraction, many people 
will take whatever option requires the least effort, or the path of 
least resistance,” Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz (2013) observe. Thaler 
maintains that “behavioral tendencies toward doing nothing will be 
reinforced if the default option comes with some implicit or explicit 
suggestion that it represents the normal or even the recommended 
course of action” (Thaler, Sunstein and Balz 2013, 430).
Users might be the best persons to control their data, but that does 
not mean that they do so. Shah and Sandvig assert that the power 
to regulate users’ behavior on the internet is in the hands not of 
individuals or legislators but those “who set software defaults” 
(2008, 26). While the meanings of “defaults,” “settings,” and “con-
figurations” differ slightly in computer science, legal contexts, and 
software studies, the consensus remains that they should not be 
taken lightly. Defaults are not only at the core of the user experi-
ence of software- based choice architectures but also expressive 
of power relations. José van Dijck claims that “Facebook has every 
interest in preserving its default settings that make information as 
open as possible” (van Dijck 2013, 53). Apte notes that Facebook’s 
privacy settings at least up until recently have been set open to 
allow the free expansion of connectivity (2020, 5). Vaidhyanathan 
argues further that companies like Facebook may claim to empow-
er us by giving us choices, but simultaneously they set the defaults 
of connectivity in their favor (2018, 74). Defaults create an illusion 
of control, a placebo effect of sorts (Vaccaro et al. 2018).
When writing about Facebook’s default settings as nudges, Apte 
notes that “either a user can be prompted to act, or she/he can be 
lulled into inaction depending on what benefits the platform.” By 
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through which the user can make their Facebook experience more 
private, the platform provides the user with an explicit form of 
control. However, the tool is also surrounded with what Apte calls 
as a “passivity- inducing nudge” (Apte 2020, 7– 8): the user needs to 
take additional steps to use the tool and turn off- Facebook Activity 
off. The tool is buried in user’s privacy settings and by default 
off- Facebook activity is always turned on. Adjusting off- Facebook 
Activity settings— and even becoming aware of the existence of 
these choices— demands conscious action. The off- Facebook 
Activity is on by default— both literally and metaphorically.
“There is no simple solution to the problem of privacy, because 
privacy itself is a solution to societal challenges that are in constant 
flux,” Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum (2015, 98) write. Vaid-
hyanathan argues that things like privacy are always subordinate 
to Facebook’s business model, which is based on capturing users’ 
data and attention “to give us [users] more of what we tell Face-
book we want and to help advertisers precisely match their pleas 
for commerce with those who might be interested in those goods 
and services” (Vaidhyanathan 2018, 76). In the following sections I 
will claim that while the Off- Facebook Activity tool provides users 
with autonomy and explicit control, the passivity- inducing nudges 
are in place to mitigate the potential financial harms stricter privacy 
settings can cause for the platform. Central here is how Facebook 
defines the off- Facebook space and the relation advertisers and 
targeted advertising have with the platform.
Off-	Facebook
When the makers of the Off- Facebook Activity tool note that the 
best persons to be in control of data are users themselves, they 
imply that individual users have the knowledge of “good” and “bad” 
data practices and that they already understand the importance of 
privacy. The point of criticism here is that instead of changing its 
core business model, Facebook keeps finding other means to tack-
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for its users via the Off- Facebook Activity tool may serve to redirect 
human behavior toward more private use of social media, but 
this nudging does not substantially alter the wider sociopolitical, 
cultural, or economic online environment, which remains based 
on unrestricted flows of information instead of privacy (cf. Pedwell 
2017, 80). Arguably, the structural problems related to data privacy 
are left untouched for a reason: advertising income.
“As of late 2018,” according to statistics cited by Anne Helmond, 
David Nieborg, and Fernando van der Vlist, “Facebook hosted over 
90 million businesses and 6 million active advertisers” (2019, 123). 
The sheer economic influence of these “third parties” illustrates 
why critics like Vaidhyanathan (2018, 9– 10) have argued that the 
company and its product have grown too large to control: “Face-
book is too big, too powerful, and too intrusive— and it works too 
well— for shallow reform to make a difference.” The platform’s 
growth is a result of what Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias (2019, 
xii) describe as “data colonialism,” a concept for how information 
technologies and “new infrastructures of connection” are “woven 
into” people’s daily lives and practices. Facebook’s power is predi-
cated on the way it has spread and found its way into online spaces 
(see also Karppi 2018).
While the Off- Facebook Activity tool can be used to analyze how 
the company frames data control as an individual responsibility, it 
can also be used to analyze the wider structural changes Facebook 
has brought to the networked environment. This outside, which 
Facebook calls “off- Facebook,” has a very particular, exact definition 
in the context of its tool.
The production of something as the outside is telling of historical, 
material, social, and economic powers at play (Probyn 1996, 12). 
Off- Facebook space is constituted by the various entities such as 
advertisers and marketers in possession of websites and apps that 
can be connected to the Facebook platform but are not owned, 
built, or managed by the corporation itself. “Off- Facebook activity is 
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us about your interactions with them, such as visiting their apps 
or websites,” Facebook (Facebook F) tells us. One way to define 
off- Facebook space is thus to look more closely at advertisers’ and 
marketers’ role in the platform, especially how they actively create 
this role by connecting themselves to the platform. A description 
of this connective practice can be found in the recent works of 
Helmond, Nieborg, and their colleagues. Building the grounds for 
their approach, Helmond (2015, 1) explains Facebook’s growth with 
the notion of platformization, which “entails the extension of social 
media platforms into the rest of the web and their drive to make 
external web data ‘platform ready.’” For Helmond, what differenti-
ates social media sites from platforms is their operative logic.
The logic of any platform involves “interoperability” in two 
interconnected senses: connecting everything within its system and 
appropriating all the different kinds of data those interconnections 
allow (Nieborg and Helmond 2019, 203). Like Couldry and Mejias, 
Nieborg and Helmond cite the intensification of this logic as the 
reason behind Facebook’s economic growth and technological 
expansion. Arguing that platformization made Facebook into the 
infrastructure of connection, Helmond, Nieborg, and van der Vlist 
(2019, 141) claim that it has gained “infrastructural properties over 
time by accumulating external dependencies through computation-
al and organisational platform integrations.” In addition, Nieborg, 
Helmond, and van der Vlist trace how throughout its history, 
Facebook has expanded its boundaries, for example, through 
application programming interfaces (APIs) and software devel-
opment kits (SDKs) that integrate different stakeholders into the 
platform. Taken together, these are what Facebook calls “business 
tools,” which, in addition to APIs and SDKs, include “the Facebook 
Pixel, Facebook social plugins, such as the Like and Share buttons, 
Facebook Login and Account Kit, and other Platform integrations, 
as well as other plugins, code, specifications, documentation, 
technology and services” (Facebook G). 
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a better user experience and businesses to improve their reach by 
more accurately targeting the “right” people (Facebook H). Adam 
Arvidsson explains that Facebook built a technology of social 
graphs to describe interactions (which it calls “edges”) between not 
only individual users but also objects (which can be users but also 
other things) (Arvidsson 2016, 10). Facebook Pixel, for example, 
measures cross- device conversions, which means that if a web-
store has integrated Pixel, it can determine whether a Facebook 
ad resulted in the purchase of goods on its site (Facebook I). This 
information is shared not only with the business but also with 
Facebook, constituting an example of off- Facebook activity.
In the platform’s own definition of off- Facebook activity, it does not 
refer to anything fundamentally outside the platform but rather 
practices of connecting things with the platform. This off- Facebook 
space is specifically occupied by business partners who want to use 
Facebook for marketing. Off- Facebook activity represents a con-
nection that takes place via the company’s own business tools: “a 
summary of activity that businesses and organizations share with 
us about your interactions, such as visiting their apps or websites” 
(Facebook C). Business tools provide access to off- Facebook activity 
information, which can be utilized to show users more relevant 
ads, give recommendations for events and Marketplace items, help 
users discover brands and businesses, and even identify suspicious 
activity (Facebook C). Off- Facebook activity includes a variety of 
interactions, from opening apps and viewing content to making 
purchases or merely adding items to shopping carts (Facebook C). 
Activity can include actions involving “apps and websites you’ve 
logged into with Facebook” as well as “data service providers 
and marketing agencies” (Facebook C). The logic governing how 
certain ads appear on particular users’ screens is tied to how 
the off- Facebook space is technically connected to the Facebook 
platform and turned into flows of information. Significantly, 
clearing one’s off- Facebook activity history does not delete the 
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individual account (Facebook A).8 If a user chooses to disconnect 
their off- Facebook activity, the number of ads they see will remain 
the same, but they should no longer be personalized. To be sure, 
ads for anything from backpacks to dating services will continue 
to appear in everyone’s Facebook account, only they would not be 
based on user activity derived from off- Facebook sites.
One of the main sources of Facebook’s power, according to José 
van Dijck, Nieborg, and Thomas Poell, (2019, 8) is its interrelational 
and dynamic structure, which I see expressed in the relationship 
between off- Facebook and, for lack of a better term, “on- Facebook,” 
both of which are really just Facebook. In the discourses of the 
Off- Facebook Activity tool, the company’s own rhetoric asserts that 
other businesses, apps, and websites constitute the off- Facebook 
space, but it is important to reiterate that Facebook’s business 
model is contingent to these edges in their network. What Face-
book describes as off- Facebook space is not an absolute outside; 
it is not completely distinct or disconnected from the platform 
but rather immanent or connected. As the hyphen in the name 
suggests, off- Facebook space is elementally conjoined, combined, 
and linked with Facebook in theory— and, in practice, with APIs 
and SDKs. It is not the negation of Facebook, since off- Facebook 
advertisers remain integral to the platform. The off- Facebook is 
constitutive to the entire existence of the platform: off- Facebook 
companies not only financially support the platform in the form 
of revenue; their objects form edges and build Facebook’s social 
graphs by bringing information to the company from across differ-
ent platforms and services. Off- Facebook for Facebook gives the 
platform its structure and grounds its limits. From this perspective, 
it is clear why for each individual user the off- Facebook environ-
ment is not off by default.
Debt
At first glance, the Off- Facebook Activity tool may appear to be a 
simple choice architecture related to controlling one’s privacy; but 
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The promotional and informational videos for the Off- Facebook 
Activity tool show the importance of the connection between third- 
party businesses and the social platform. For individual users, the 
discourses surrounding the tool rationalize the company’s practices 
of personalized targeted marketing and devalue privacy in favor of 
the delivery of “better,” “more accurate,” “more interesting” content.
To stress the importance of advertisers to the platform, a voice-
over in a video “Why Do Ads Feel Like They Are Directed to You, 
Personally?” (Facebook J), that appears in the tool’s promotional 
materials as additional reference, explains that “advertising has 
become more tailored. More personal. And that’s more effective 
because people prefer ads that are relevant to them.” Significantly, 
the voiceover also emphasizes that “this creates incentives for 
advertisers to make ads that are truly tailored to people’s interests. 
And these ads are what helped make the most of the Internet free” 
(Facebook J). The implication is that if users stop receiving targeted 
ads from Facebook (by for example using the Off- Facebook Activity 
tool), not only will their experience suffer, but the existence of 
the whole platform will be at risk. The second informational video 
“Where Online Advertising Is Headed,” which also appears as 
reference material for the Off- Facebook Activity tool, uses almost 
the exact same language:
Turns out people would rather see ads for things they 
like. And because the web’s revenue model is mostly 
ad supported, seeing ads means you can use services 
like search engines and social media free of charge. It is 
important for  ads to feel relevant because if they aren’t, 
then people won’t click on them. And if they don’t click, 
businesses won’t find them valuable and won’t want to 
advertise on the web, which means no more free web. 
(Facebook K; emphasis added.)
While the company may provide users with tools to control their 
privacy, it hardly encourages them to do so in the promotional 
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users to accept the defaults of the Off- Facebook Activity tool. The 
nudge here is that Facebook is only free because users let the out-
side in; users are allegedly doing themselves a favor when they let 
the company connect them to businesses and serve up targeted 
advertisements based on their personal Facebook profiles.
This perspective of course is hardly new. Susanna Paasonen 
(2018) points out that data, time, and attention are the price paid 
for a “free” Facebook. Although Paasonen builds productively 
on criticism that using Facebook’s platform can be considered in 
terms of a market where users exchange commodities with the 
platform, the promotional materials for the Off- Facebook Activity 
tool provide another way to think about our engagement with the 
platform.
Let me return to the term “default,” which according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary has additional meanings that cannot be reduced 
to technology settings: “failure to do something required or expect-
ed,“ especially the “failure to appear in court” or the “failure to meet 
financial commitments.”9 Adopting this additional sense of defaults 
can sharpen our analysis of Facebook user relation in terms of 
debt. In this model, users do not exchange commodities with 
the platform but offer repayments for the bond issued between 
Facebook and themselves. The important difference here is that 
exchange relation operates through temporary dynamics— entities 
enter and exit exchanges freely— but for the debt- relation there 
is no exit or outside until the debt has been paid. As a mode of 
engagement, debt is thus always more binding than an exchange.
Facebook can be interpreted as a debt market in both financial 
and moral senses. Facebook’s nudges in the promotional and 
instructional videos include an emotional appeal that users owe 
the platform their information. First, the videos imply that, given 
that the platform is “free,” users should not think about it as a 
business but as a favor; anyone who signs up carries this debt of 
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them to repay it is to refrain from adjusting their off- Facebook 
activity settings or disconnecting their Facebook accounts. In 
return for the platform’s services, users are expected to pay their 
dues by accepting not only targeted ads but the company’s entire 
advertisement- based business model— because without these 
things, social platforms would apparently lose their revenue  
and fold.
The debt relation also relies on the idea that the users consciously 
or unconsciously are trying to avert their losses. To this end, the 
discourses surrounding the Off- Facebook Activity tool underscore 
the disadvantages of using tools to restrict data flows: some may 
be personal, affecting the quality of users’ everyday experience 
of the platform; others may be collective, as in the company’s 
assertion that a “free web” is contingent on targeted marketing. 
Mobilizing a familiar “slippery slope” argument, Facebook’s rhetoric 
of the Off- Facebook Activity tool presents a single user’s seemingly 
“free choice” or to disconnect as a threat to everyone.
What is at stake here is the users “right to disconnect” (Hesselberth 
2018, 1995, 2006). It would be an overinterpretation to claim that 
this set of nudges, which highlight the importance of targeted 
marketing for Facebook and places the entire model of the free 
web at risk, are intentionally placed to manipulate the users not to 
use the tool. Rather, what we see here is that for Facebook nothing 
can exist outside this model of connectivity without also being 
destructive for their business. Hence folding everything inside and 
keeping it there becomes of crucial importance to the extent that 
the outside of connectivity gradually disappears.
Outside
“The problem always has the solution it deserves,” as Gilles Deleuze 
(1991, 16) puts it, “in terms of the way in which it is stated (i.e. the 
conditions under which it is determined as problem), and of the 
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said of the Off- Facebook Activity tool: its discourses show that the 
“problems” of privacy as they are defined by the company exclude 
the material conditions of the platform and the business model 
built around effective, data- based targeted marketing. These two 
defaults remain unchanged. Presenting the tool as a “solution” for 
more than two billion active Facebook users is like suggesting a 
band- aid for a bullet wound. It may stop a drip of leaky data here 
and there, but it does not change the business model that relies on 
its unobstructed circulation.
In place of a conclusion, I argue that a theorization of the problem 
of the outside can open a new vector for thinking about discon-
nection beyond the Off- Facebook Activity tool and the nudges it 
encapsulates. The Off- Facebook Activity tool presents solutions 
that are only applicable for the user who is already within the 
system, and the same applies to the nudge theory. “At the end of 
the day,” Pedwell (2017, 80– 81) asserts, “nudge theory’s focus is on 
changing individual behavior (through superficial modifications of 
administrative arrangements and other choice architectures) rather 
than enacting deeper social or structural changes, or, indeed, un-
derstanding the complex and shifting interactions among bodies, 
infrastructures and environments.” Mona Mannevuo (2019, 35), 
who explores the use of nudges in the context of universal basic 
income experiments, points out that for the theory, freedom of the 
choice is an illusion: “people are free to make choices— as long as 
they make choices within the post- bureaucratic choice architecture 
constructed by the state.” If nudge theory remains focused on 
managing how fruits, desserts, and sponge cakes are organized in 
a cafeteria, then it can fall far short of changing nutrition standards 
and meal requirements on a more comprehensive level. If nudge 
theory is primarily about tweaking opt- ins and opt- outs for the 
retirement system, then it might foreclose the possibility of re-
thinking pension as a whole. When Facebook designs a feature that 
disconnects for a more private user experience, that disconnection 
still happens safely within the parameters of the platform.
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“breaks and disruptions,” force us to think “what it means to con-
nect, or to relate, in the first place.” What I have tried to address in 
this chapter, in contrast, is the importance of understanding what 
you disconnect to when you use the Off- Facebook Activity tool. One 
could be reminded here that the word “disconnect” consists of two 
parts: dis- meaning “the opposite of” and the root, connect, is based 
on a Latin verb connectere, which has two parts: con- (together) + 
nectere (bind), as in “to join together.” While contemporary discon-
nection studies have focused heavily on showing that disconnec-
tion is a meaningful act in its apparent opposition to connection, 
what has evaded attention is the question of what becomes joined 
together in the act of disconnecting: what is the outside that is 
affirmed and finds its shape in disconnection?
One of the theorists interested in this question is Hesselberth, 
whose structuring paradox of disconnection is inspired by the 
notion of the “constitutive outside” by Chantal Mouffe, who in turn 
takes it from Jacques Derrida (Hesselberth 2018, 2007). According 
to Mouffe (2005, 15), the constitutive outside explains how the cre-
ation of identity is relational and contingent to “the establishment 
of difference, difference which is often constructed on the basis 
of hierarchy, for example between form and matter, black and 
white, man and woman, etc.” This is the difference users find if they 
activate their Off- Facebook Activity tool. By developing the tool, the 
company develops an artificial opposition between the inside and 
outside, between the platform and the marketers. The user discon-
nects their personal data flows from marketers and advertisers, 
but this is only a partial disconnect. The user does not disconnect 
from Facebook or even its fundamental form of business practice; 
as repeated by the promotional materials, the user will still see ads. 
The user is still within the reach of marketers and advertisers who 
with software developer kits and APIs are part of the platform.
The outside that Facebook designs and delimits with the tool takes 
a form that resembles the inside and thus corresponds to the 
conditions under which it is being designed.10 Privacy does not 
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ized it is. Thus, when disconnecting their off- Facebook activity users 
do not end up in the outside but rather find themselves being in 
the offside. This offside is immanent to the “rules of the game” and 
has a specified function within the system: the offside is Facebook 
with less personalized content. The difference the tool produces 
is only a difference in degree in which users are exploited and 
thus does not have much to do with a more structural qualitative 
change.11 The offside masked as the outside is not the negation of 
connection.
Hesselberth (2018, 2007) argues that the constitutive outside 
forces us to see the limits of connectivity and hence offers a point 
of resistance to the claims that there is “‘no outside’ to our ‘current 
culture of connectivity.’” The off- Facebook taken as the offside, in 
contrast, indicates that even the outside, at least partly, can be 
connected and captured by the logic of connectivity. In this sense, 
the offside seems to be a manifestation of what Taina Bucher 
(2020, 611) means when she says that practices of opting out and 
even refusals to connect are nothing but forms of connection and 
“there is nothing to disconnect from in the digital world” (610). 
What Bucher with this claim seeks for is not to refute the acts of 
disconnection completely, but to find new ways to articulate what 
being- with the outside means (615– 16).
Keith Ansell-Pearson (1999, 84) writes that “it is the forces of 
the ‘outside’ which impinge and impact upon us, upon what we 
think we are and what we think we are capable of becoming.” If 
off- Facebook is the outside at the user’s reach, there is very little 
liberation in the act of disconnecting. If everyone retains the given 
choice architectures or keeps on only nudging this or that, they will 
never change the whole system. It should be noted, however, that 
Pearson in the quote above is referring to Deleuze’s understanding 
of the outside instead of Derrida’s or Mouffe’s. The implication 
of this perspective is that the outside should not be conceived 
through opposition or negation. In the Deleuzean reading, the 
incipience of resistance resides with disconnection but only if, as a 
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external to its relation with Facebook.12
My examination of Facebook and off- Facebook shows that the 
relations between online and offline, Facebook and off- Facebook, 
inside and outside perform specific functions for the company. Off- 
Facebook and on- Facebook are both based on a specific imaginary 
of the outside that is functional. The function of this imaginary is to 
define the relation of being- with Facebook. Either we are immersed 
fully with the Facebook experiences and the features and functions 
that constitute it, or our experience is limited by the disconnected 
off- Facebook activity. In both cases, the insides and the outsides 
belong to Facebook and are being defined by them. Yet, an outside 
that cannot be undone exists. The world, the offline, even the 
free internet exists independently to any particular imaginary or 
manifestation of social media. There is always something we can 
disconnect to. As Ansell-Pearson (1999, 84) notes, “It is the peristaltic 
movements of the outside which serve to destratify fixed and 
stable identities and produce through doubling processes new 
possibilities for an intenser and more creative existence.” What 
disconnection studies needs are not only different theories of 
relations but also ways to find the outside.
Notes
 1 Transcribed by the author. 
 2 The same video is also featured on “What Is Off- Facebook Activity?” website 
(Facebook C).
 3 This is the so- called endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991, 
194).
 4 Choice is a central notion in the emerging field of nudge theory. This theory is 
credited to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Thaler was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in 2017 for his work in behavioral economics.
 5 On social media, personalization, as done by current algorithmic media sys-
tems and understood as a nudge, uses data on users’ connections, habits, 
and preferences to predict the choices that become available for them. Karen 
Yeung calls algorithmically personalized nudges “hypernudges,” because they 
are “networked,” “continuously updated,” “dynamic,” “pervasive,” potent and 
thus powerful (Yeung 2017). The Off- Facebook Activity tool, however, is much 
more traditional in its operations.
74  6 Yang Wang et al. (2014) have suggested that privacy nudges designed spe-
cifically for the Facebook user interface can help users “consider the content 
and audience of their online disclosures more carefully” and avoid regretting 
making Facebook posts. One example of the privacy nudges they designed is a 
feature that shows the audience reacting to a Facebook post before it is posted 
and then delays posting it with a visible countdown timer, giving the user time 
to delete the message after hitting the send button but before the audience 
sees it. The nudge here is not textual but based on Facebook’s user- interface 
design and provides a visual aid for decision making. Implementation of this 
nudge would also change the default action when the user hits the send button 
from an instant to a delayed response. The takeaway is that the user interface 
is designed in a certain way and should not be taken as given. Furthermore, as 
Yeung points out, software- based algorithmic choice architecture can be con-
tinuously reconfigured and optimized (Yeung 2017, 122).
 7 In 2018, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came 
into effect. Its purpose was to establish requirements for businesses operating 
with user data to keep the data protected and give EU citizens more control 
over their data. The off-Facebook Activity tool can be seen as one of Facebook’s 
responses to the GDPR (Ready 2019).
 8 As described in the promotional materials (Facebook A): “The information you 
disconnect will no longer be connected to your account. This data can still be 
used without being linked to an individual user to allow us [Facebook] to let 
businesses know how their website, app, or ads are performing.”
 9 “Default.” Oxford English Dictionary. Accessed April 27, 2020. https://www.oed 
.com/view/Entry/48723?rskey=x83Jjk&result=1#eid.
10 What I am paraphrasing here is Deleuze’s take on the relation of solution and 
problem but also his criticism of understanding difference through resem-
blance (Deleuze 2004).
11 See here Deleuze’s (2004, 299– 300) discussion between the difference in de-
gree and difference in kind.
12 Deleuze in Dialogues II famously argues that “relations are external to their 
terms” and “relations may change without the terms changing” (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2007, 55). Hence, we should not think the terms or the relations inde-
pendently but together (56). Here I am also in debt to Levi Bryant, who in a blog 
post interprets Deleuze and argues that “insofar as relations are external to 
their terms, insofar as objects are independent of their relations, where rela-
tions exist we can begin with the assurance that these relations were built or 
constructed” (Bryant 2011).
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Clara Wieghorst and Lea P. Zierott
The equivocality of disconnection calls for collecting and as-
sembling the different ways disconnection is understood across 
different disciplines, practices, and media technologies. Hardly 
a fully developed concept, let alone a coherent research field, 
disconnection is more like a placeholder for discussions about 
leaving networks, cutting connections, and refusing to be part 
of something. The following entries contain several examples of 
negative prefixes (un- , dis- , and de- ), which we suggest seeing as 
positive practices of undoing networks. “In lieu of a conclusion,” as 
Brian Massumi titles the last chapter of his book Politics of Affect 
(2015), this glossary does not aim to present an overview of estab-
lished theoretical concepts but to pose better problems. Thus, this 
glossary makes no claim to completeness but can be understood 
as a playful attempt at mapping practices of undoing networks.
Even though disconnection discourses are equivocal (Hesselberth 
2018), there are some recurrent strands of argumentation. Public 
discourses on disconnection often presume the existence of some 
state or space free of any media: “the analog,” “irl” (in real life), or 
“offline,” which are contrasted with “the digital,” “virtual,” or “online” 
environments that encompass everything computerized. To break 
with this digital dualism (Jurgenson 2013), this glossary presents 
a mapping of phenomena of undoing networks that pose better 
problems, such as pointing to the paradox of dis/connectivity 
80 (Hesselberth 2018; Karppi 2018) or arguing that “the analog,” far 
from being natural, needs to be constructed (Stäheli and Stolten-
berg 2020). While some discourses of disconnection are linked to 
a neoliberal agenda of self- responsibilization, other movements or 
artistic practices aim to disrupt platform capitalism. The question 
of undoing networks is not merely a technical problem but a 
social and political one. Organizing the entries as interconnected 
sociopolitical phenomena rather than isolated theoretical concepts 
or names of celebrated authors should call attention to how 
disconnection is embedded in our everyday lives.
Analog Nostalgia
One epiphenomenon arising from the ubiquity of digital media is 
nostalgia for what are commonly known as “analog media” (Marks 
2012; Schrey 2014). In media studies, the distinction between “dig-
ital” and “analog” remains contentious (Sterne 2016; Peters 2016). 
In everyday usage, however, analog media are defined quite simply 
as anything that is not computerized.1 Living an “analog life” has 
become an entire trend. From analog photography to collecting 
and listening to vinyl records, from analog travel guides to coloring 
books for grown- ups, there is a whole range of activities and prod-
ucts that allow one to pursue “offline” hobbies.
Analog nostalgists feel that disconnecting from digital media and 
engaging with analog media enhances their lives. They experience 
the elaborate process of analog photography as rewarding; they 
like the “authentic” sound of vinyl. Analog nostalgists feel that trav-
eling without Google Maps encourages them to talk to strangers 
and enhances their knowledge of foreign places. Ironically, there 
are digital apps like Hipstamatic, which aim to apply the aesthetics 
of analog photography to digital pictures taken with smartphones. 
Thus, analog nostalgia is hardly restricted to “old media” and can 
also be lived out via “new media.” Significantly, the category of an-
alog media was only created with the emergence of digital media, 
since it was not previously necessary to differentiate between the 
two modes.
81Analog nostalgia does refer to more than the use of analog media. 
Especially within critical discourses on social media platforms, the 
adjective is increasingly used as a noun: “the analog” describes a 
pristine state or a space free of any media. The analog promises a 
more authentic and more human connection than found on social 
media. Ironically, a media theoretical adjective is used to describe 
a purportedly nonmedial condition. Stäheli and Stoltenberg (2020) 
describe the extensive work that goes into the construction of “the 
analog,” drawing on case studies from digital detox tourism. They 
call this process of creating supposedly media- free zones “analo-
gization,” which turns out to be a heavily mediated process. The 
analog has to be created through the use of media including books, 
maps, or typewriters.
Break
In the context of disconnection, the “break” represents a con-
ceptual category in theoretical research and a common theme in 
popular discourses calling for disconnection. Relating the break 
to affect theory, Jenny Sundén (2018) points to its disruptive and 
heuristic functions. To actualize “the queer potentials” (2018, 64) 
of the break, Sundén highlights moments of disconnectivity that 
potentially can open up new modes of relationality. The break’s 
heuristic function consists in its ability “to bring forth what constant 
connectivity means, and how it feels” (64).
In popular discourses on disconnection, it is often argued that 
we need to take a break, whether it be from constantly looking at 
our phones, from refreshing our feeds on social media, or from 
following the news. While digital detox holidays promise a break 
from ubiquitous connectivity, the pursuit of analog hobbies claims 
to create a break from our digitally organized everyday lives. In this 
sense, digital connectivity is a state from which we need to take 
a break, whereas the break itself is a state that is necessarily free 
from digital media. Realistically, however, we often use the internet 
to take a break from other activities such as work or socializing. 
For many people, watching YouTube videos or shopping online can 
82 be relaxing, even rewarding activities after an exhausting day at 
the office. For others, the fact that they require typing and looking 
at a screen makes these leisure activities hardly distinguishable 
from work.
When standing awkwardly at a bus stop or in the corner of a room 
at a party, your smartphone can save you from making small talk. 
Checking social media or dating apps— or, in many cases, pretend-
ing to check them— might help introverts feel sociable and look 
busy at the same time. But as discourses on disconnection become 
increasingly popular, staring at your phone might also be dismissed 
as antisocial behavior. Comparing smartphones or the internet to 
cigarettes evokes not only a sense of addiction but also of breaks. 
Smoking a cigarette allows one to take a break from work and 
to do something at a party (as opposed to looking forlorn and 
self- conscious). Whereas smoking was once seen as a legitimate— 
even cool— activity, it is now widely considered to be unhealthy and 
irresponsible. The same holds true for smartphones along a much 
shorter span of time: they used to be fancy devices one could brag 
about (as is still possible in particular contexts) but their popularity 
is steadily declining. However, smartphone breaks and smoking 
breaks might differ in terms of their organizational effects. In 
cigarette breaks, it is possible that “relationships [between smokers 
are] being formed that would otherwise not occur” (Brewis and 
Grey 2008, 981), since people from different hierarchical positions 
have the chance to meet. What kinds of relationships might be 
formed among those who are taking a break from their phones 
and among those who are taking a break on their phones meeting 
on the Internet?
Dead Zones
As a gap in a comprehensive connection, the “dead zone” appears 
mostly as a problem— as something that needs to be eliminated. 
There are a variety of different technologies for finding and report-
ing places without (cellular or internet) coverage. There are also 
83apps, like White Spots, that reinterpret the dead zone in positive 
terms. If you press the “get me out” button, you are guided to a 
map that shows “white spots” (i.e., places without coverage) around 
the world. Here you can find digital detox camps and hotels as well 
as phone- free cafés. In addition to these time- out places, the dead 
spot also represents a refuge for people who describe themselves 
as electromagnetic hypersensitive.
Since dead zones are often the result of a geographical discon-
nection that goes hand- in- hand with a digital one, they open up a 
spatial perspective: How is the dead zone spatially delimited and 
where do its borders lie? Usually caused by a lack of service or 
failure of infrastructure, there is no need for users to create dead 
zones. The practices that can be observed here therefore relate 
primarily to the organization of an already disconnected space.
To ask how dead zones occur raises questions about their technical 
foundation. Are dead zones actual holes in a horizontal, area- wide 
expansion of electromagnetic waves, or simply the result of a 
lack of radio and cellular towers? In fact, both are the case. In 
technical terms, a dead zone is an area in which the connection 
between transmitter and receiver is not possible, or only possible 
to create an insignificant degree of reception. This may be because 
the distance is simply too far or because the wave carrying the 
signal is intentionally interrupted or unintentionally disturbed. 
Transmission always depends on factors including atmosphere, 
weather influences, and the conductivity of the earth; additional 
disturbances or obstacles, such as roads, buildings, mountains, and 
narrow valleys, can further prevent the wave from propagating. 
Dead zones also occur when the radiation is absorbed by different 
objects. In addition to forests, the human body is another relatively 
large absorber, which can soak up certain kinds of radiation 
through the skin.
Besides these passive occurrences, the active creation of dead 
zones raises questions of power. Like many other countries, 
the U.S. government manages a huge area within which radio 
84 transmission is restricted for scientific research and military 
purposes. The National Radio Quiet Zone is a dead zone by law, 
divided into different zones according to the electronic devices that 
may be used there.
The question of mapping dead zones calls for alternative repre-
sentations of networks. Mejias (2013) contests the logic of most 
network theories, which tend to focus on nodes, by concentrating 
on the spaces between them. The “paranodes” build a multidimen-
sional space, which is located at the same time both inside and 
outside the network.
Digital Detox
The term “digital detox” describes a trend that seems to be insep-
arable from other current movements in support of mindfulness 
and healthism. People who take good care of themselves not only 
eat superfoods and practice yoga and meditation; they must also 
“unplug” from time to time in order to “recharge.” Digital Detox® 
is the name of a company “focused on helping people be more 
present and improve the balance with technology use in their lives” 
(Digital Detox 2020).
The company’s slogan is “Disconnect to Reconnect.” Since 2012, 
Digital Detox® has hosted Camp Grounded®, a three- night adult 
summer camp where people travel to somewhere in California 
without an internet connection in order to “connect with one 
another, without devices” (Digital Detox 2020).2 Campers can partic-
ipate in what the organizers call “playshops.” Separately, Digital 
Detox® arranges “unplugged nights out” in cities all over the Unit-
ed States where participants can meet new people without being 
distracted by their phones. Digital Detox® also funds research on 
the impact of technology and offers a certification to schools for 
combatting phone overuse among children and teenagers.
As a result of digital detox, phone use, or more generally “the dig-
ital,” is toxified (Sutton 2017). Among many other scholars, Adam 
85Fish (2017) has criticized the neoliberal attempt to make individuals 
take responsibility for facing the impositions of capitalism and then 
selling them expensive products and packages to help them to 
get fit.
The underlying premise of the company’s philosophy— and by 
now its numerous imitators— is its distinction between “good” and 
“bad” connections. The idea is that human beings feel a natural 
urge to connect with one another, a desire that cannot be satis-
fied by connecting via technological devices. If phone overuse is 
taken to contain the risk of damaging our ability to connect, then, 
according to proponents of digital detox, we need to “disconnect to 
reconnect.”
Digital	Detox	Beauty	Products
According to some proponents of digital detox, phone overuse 
and too much “screen time” threatens both our (mental) health 
and our (physical) beauty (in a very holistic sense). To mitigate the 
damaging effects of spending hours on digital devices, people can 
buy pricy beauty products.
One German natural cosmetic brand sells an anti- blue- light facial 
oil that attempts to cash in on the popularity of blue- light blocking 
computer glasses. It contains the ingredient marigold, which 
protects the skin against blue- light radiation from screens. This 
blue light is said not only to damage cells and contribute to skin 
aging but also to be the dominant cause of eyestrain resulting from 
extended periods of screen usage. Even though all of these claims 
have been debunked by scientific research, an American cosmetic 
brand offers a digital detox bath soak that promises to relieve its 
users from “EMFs” (electric and magnetic fields) and to fight the 
“wired and tired” syndrome. In one Vancouver- based culture mag-
azine’s review of the soak, users are recommended to drink plenty 
of water and not to stay in the tub too long, because the “soak’s job 
is to literally rid the body of toxins”— an “intense . . . purification 
process” (Markovinovic 2019).
86 Once out of the bath, one can use a mineral- rich digital detox face 
mist, which purports to reenergize its user and to protect the skin 
from screen fatigue. The product description markets the face mist 
as “indispensable for air travel, at work or when using computers 
and mobile devices” (Niche Beauty, n.d.).
These digital detox beauty products, all of which come in beau-
tifully designed packaging, are perfect examples of how media 
nonconsumption (Portwood- Stacer 2013) and temporary discon-
nection (Jorge 2019) can be part of neoliberal consumer capitalism. 
Their marketing agenda is based on creating desire by spreading 
anxiety. The underlying argumentation is this: We live in a toxic 
environment and live unhealthily. Spending our days in big cities, 
on airplanes or working on screens has damaging effects on our 
skin and our overall health. But don’t worry— by buying these 
products you can protect yourself from serious damage and rid 
your body of toxins.
Through discourse analysis of Instagram, Ana Jorge (2019) has 
shown how digital disconnection and interruption are reintegrated 
on social media in the form of lifestyle choices. A selfie posted from 
a digital detox bath clearly illustrates how commodified practices of 
disconnection have become part of our everyday digital lives.
Digital	Minimalism
Participating in the larger minimalist revival, the title of Cal New-
port’s latest book is Digital Minimalism (2019). A follow- up to Deep 
Work (2016) and How to Become a Straight- A Student (2006), the 
self- help guide gives practical advice on how to live a fulfilled life by 
regaining control over technology. Digital minimalists are people 
who are able to enjoy “offline” activities like reading a book, listen-
ing to other people or taking a walk without feeling the constant 
urge to check their phones. They can enjoy social events without 
needing to document them on Instagram and keep track of the 
news without suffering from information overload.
87As part of his efforts to teach readers how to become digital 
minimalists, Newport’s “Study Hacks Blog” (2020) encourages his 
followers to take part in “The Analog January Challenge.” Because 
quitting screen- based activities can only be enjoyable when 
engaging in analog alternatives, Newport suggests five commit-
ments: Read (three to four books, no matter which ones); Move (go 
for a fifteen- minute walk every day, without one’s phone); Connect 
(have a “real” conversation with twenty different people during the 
month); Make (find a hobby that requires interaction with the physi-
cal world); and Join (a local group of people that meets weekly).
Unlike radical renunciation, digital minimalism does not recom-
mend deleting all of one’s social media accounts or even living a life 
without technology. Rather, its aim is to help people live a better 
life by making them feel less dependent on their technology. Digital 
minimalism is about moderation. It does not have any political im-
petus such as criticizing surveillance capitalism or the impertinence 
of permanent availability. Rather, it is consistent with the neoliberal 
agenda of creating resilient individuals that take responsibility for 
their own (mental) health and work efficiency.
Digital	Suicide
Seppukoo.com and the Web 2.0 Suicide Machine are two art proj-
ects analyzed in an article by Tero Karppi (2011) on “Digital Suicide.” 
Established in 2009, they both offered a form of digital “death” on 
Facebook and other social media platforms. Over a decade later, 
these art projects may seem ancient. As Facebook lost its populari-
ty, it became more common for users to delete their accounts and 
keep only those on Twitter and Instagram, which of course is now 
owned by Facebook. Nevertheless, both art projects can still be 
seen as early examples of artistic disconnection practices, as cases 
of tactical media aiming to disrupt dominant platform capitalism.
Each project works differently than strategies of digital minimalism 
or digital detox, which tend to aim at personal well- being rather 
88 than resistance. The rebellious character of Seppukoo (the name 
refers to a form of Japanese ritual suicide) and the Web 2.0 Suicide 
Machine is attested to by the fact that Facebook fought legal 
battles against each of them. For a brief period of time, Seppukoo.
com announced that “due to the paradoxical controversy between 
the giant Facebook and Seppukoo, our suicidal services are now 
useless” (Seppukoo 2009). Alongside this announcement, there is 
a video of Japanese Samurais accompanied by voices speaking in 
Japanese (with English subtitles) telling the story of the website’s 
demise.3
The Web 2.0 Suicide Machine no longer works either. Its services 
once operated by having Facebook users who were willing to 
commit digital suicide enter their Facebook username and 
password. While Seppukkoo would have then logged into the user’s 
Facebook account and used their information to create a memorial 
page on Seppukoo.com, the Web 2.0 Suicide Machine would have 
simply changed the user’s password so that they were not able to 
log into Facebook anymore. The user’s profile picture would then 
have been changed into the Web 2.0 Suicide Machine logo, and 
their Facebook friends deleted one- by- one. This whole process 
happened automatically and was visible to the user. As Karppi puts 
it, “The Facebook life [sic!] is disappearing in front of the user’s 
eyes” (2011, 10).
Disappearing
In her video installation “How Not to Be Seen,” whose title reframes 
the classic Monty Python sketch of the same name, artist Hito 
Steyerl seeks more serious ways of becoming invisible. “Whatever 
is not captured by resolution is invisible” (Steyerl 2013) she states, 
suggesting several tactics of disappearance. As in the classic sketch, 
most of these tactics aim at becoming invisible in the sense of “not 
being part of a picture” and thus being unseen. Escaping the overall 
demand for transparency is seen as a process rather than a yes- 
or- no decision. Visibility and invisibility are not distinct opposites 
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to the state of not being addressable or not being able to be found 
(Yamamoto- Masson 2014).
Another strategy of disappearing is to be seen too much. Obfus-
cation is an activist practice of producing too much noise and 
spreading misleading information, which can become a tool against 
surveillance (Brunton and Nissenbaum 2015). Disappearing be-
comes a political act not only in the decision to elude the regime of 
visibility but also in the sense of seeing it as a process of liberation. 
Beyond its function as a political tactic, becoming imperceptible or 
impersonal is the final form of becoming per se (Papadopoulos and 
Tsianos 2007). Disappearance is then a positive state of being from 
which one can act. As active practices, forms of disappearance and 
places of hiding can be read as tactics of disconnecting from the 
network and opting not to be seen anymore.
Disconnection Apps
Is your screen shimmering with different signals in all colors and 
shapes? Can you see one wireless carrier signal two meters away 
and another 230 meters away? Do you hear a noise that sounds 
like a Geiger counter in a nuclear power plant? Who wouldn’t want 
to press the “get me out” button that stops it all and leads one to 
the nearest “dead zone.” That is what you experience as a user of 
the White Spots App. Founded by information designer Richard 
Vijgen, the multimedia project not only visualizes the otherwise 
invisible electromagnetic waves of nearby surroundings but 
also indicates places without connection and therefore without 
radiation.
As White Spots illustrates, undoing networks is often mediated via 
digital technology in the form of yet another app. The large variety 
of disconnection applications can be divided into two main types, 
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There are those that 
form part of self- care practices and those for achieving a healthy 
work– life balance. Instead of a complete renouncement of digital 
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users block calls, messages, and sometimes even internet access; 
some can pause other apps for a self- chosen period (e.g. Offtime; 
Freedom); others even suggest mindfulness skills aimed at slowing 
down and becoming more focused (e.g. PAUSE).
Self- care practices often go hand- in- hand with the monitoring 
of users. As Melissa Gregg shows in her book Counterproductive 
(2018), there are also those apps that analyze user behavior while 
monitoring their screen time and tracking their clicks (e.g. Offtime; 
Apple’s Screen time; Moment; QualityTime; Checky). In the realm of 
privacy and data protection, some apps offer antitracking instru-
ments and VPN clients to guarantee anonymity while searching 
the web (e.g. Disconnect.me; AdGuard; NoTrack). Disconnection 
here becomes a technological process of self- care, as Google’s 
recent Paper Phone experiment shows: Quite literally just a piece 
of paper, the Paper Phone lets you choose which information 
from your nonpaper phone you need for the day and then print 
it on real paper, which can be cut and folded to hold credit cards. 
This minimalistic version of your phone should help you be more 
“focused.”
Doing Nothing
In his installation “Robot, doing nothing” for the 2017 Ars Electron-
ica Festival in Linz, Austria, artist Emanuel Gollob created a robot 
that, as its name indicates, does nothing but move its arm back 
and forth. Standing in front of the robot, the observer’s attention is 
captured by its repetitive movement and at the same time lulled by 
its aesthetic design. According to Gollob, the project “accuses our 
modern society of being incessantly busy even beyond the confines 
of everyday life in the workplace. What’s now demanded of us— 
above all due to the proliferation of digital technologies— is our 
permanent presence, readiness to communicate and receptivity to 
information” (Gollob 2020).
Refusing to function as a particular part of society is hardly a new 
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strike— was already a political act, a refusal expressed against the 
ruling order of capital (Tronti 1966). As a timeless structure, a rup-
ture in a chronology, the moment of doing nothing becomes a way 
of “falling out of the rhythm,” as Stäheli (2014) describes it. There is 
also an infrastructural dimension to these non- events, which Ehn 
and Löfgren (2010) call “unglamorous events.” “Doing nothing” can 
be seen as opting out of the norms of society and thereby, with 
the help of technologies, escaping it for a short period of time. 
One’s lack of (social) value could become an act of critique in itself, 
inflecting the act of unplugging and doing nothing with a sense of 
active autonomy instead of seeing it as merely the other side of 
the call for connection. Moments of not functioning can be filled 
with pleasure, as in watching the robot’s movements. Put this way, 
“doing nothing” becomes an aesthetic form of critique.
Electromagnetic	Hypersensitivity	(EHS)
What do you do when you are allergic to something that is found 
almost everywhere? Those who suffer from “electromagnetic 
hypersensitivity” (EHS) claim that they are sensitive to electromag-
netic fields and waves at levels beyond the maximum permitted 
radiation. These sensitivities are said to arise particularly from 
Wi- Fi, radio, and mobile phones. Symptoms are said to include a 
general disposition to headaches, insomnia, and cell damage. To 
date, there have not been any successful scientific validations of 
patient claims to suffer from EHS, and it is not a recognized medical 
diagnosis by any countries or international organizations. One 
slight exception is Sweden, where EHS is recognized as a functional 
impairment but not a medical condition.
Those who self- identify as having EHS are often highly experienced 
in shielding themselves from electromagnetic waves. As well as 
protecting their body with shielding materials like metal foil and 
special textiles, their living spaces can become equipped with 
special baldachins draped over the bed, sleeping bags with silver 
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paint the walls and keep out all traces of radiation. The market for 
these kinds of products is large, encompassing various devices 
that promise to “harmonize” electromagnetic fields by influencing 
the “vibrations” of electrons and protons. Special plugs promise to 
create an environment without radiation: once connected with the 
power circuit, they still allow the use of cell phones and Wi- Fi.
Finding a suitable place to live is especially difficult for people with 
EHS. Shielding a particular space is often not enough, and so they 
need to find a place where radiation is not as strong or does not 
exist at all. Personal reports on blogs illustrate how people with 
EHS organize their lives in dead zones. In most cases, this means 
sleeping in a caravan somewhere in the forest without electricity 
and water, always on the run from the nearest radio mast. Some 
claims of EHS exhibit a dangerous proximity to conspiracy theories: 
“deadly radiation” is one buzzword that is used by the same sects 
who also deny climate change and claim that Jews control the 
world.
Faraday	Cage
What to do in case of a thunderstorm? Find a car or a plane and 
you will be safe. Because these are enclosures composed of a 
conductive material, their interiors are shielded from electric 
discharge. The exterior of the cage does not even have to be fully 
closed. As is the case with microwave ovens, a mesh is sufficient to 
keep radiation in (or out) because the holes in the net need only 
to be smaller than the length of the waves. Because of the wide 
range of frequencies, not every cage is radiation- proof, depending 
on the material of which it is made.
Faraday Cages were originally invented for the military and other 
organizations as a means of protecting vital IT or delicate electrical 
equipment from electromagnetic pulse attacks or lightning strikes. 
They are also used to shield from eavesdropping rooms where 
sensitive topics are being discussed. Because they block signals 
93only passively, Faraday Cages are legal and there is a range of 
devices available for purchase on the open market. One look at 
Amazon reveals the most popular ways in which Faraday Cages 
are used: for shielding car keys, phones, and credit cards; or the 
“blackout- privacy protection security 6 pieces ultra- thick prepping 
kit” for more extensive protection.
Forest
In smartphone communication, data signals are digitized and 
transformed into high- frequency electromagnetic radiation. To 
transmit the signal, masts send electromagnetic waves to the 
respective receiver. The transmission depends on various factors 
including weather conditions and/or the conductivity of the earth 
or water; barriers and interferences can also prevent the radio 
wave from spreading. Along with factors like shadowing or reflec-
tion, absorption plays a major role in shaping transmission. Radio 
waves hit objects that absorb them. These objects can be buildings 
and plants, as well as the human body. The forest is one particu-
larly large absorber, since it intercepts and dissipates radio waves 
through its leaves and branches.
As a result, forests can become hideouts for those who do not  
want to be found or want to escape electromagnetic radiation. 
Along with living in a digital society goes the idea of a transparent 
media and social space, in which everything and everybody can 
always be located. Disconnection— the act of opting out of digital 
networks— requires the creation of opaque locations, such as  
hideouts and other clandestine places (Stäheli 2014). The un-
plugged space is clandestine insofar as it evades digital control  
and visualization— it is not to be seen.
Since forests are often dead zones, it is no coincidence that 
they are also the site of a famous imaginary of disconnection 
in literature. In her novel Notre vie dans les forêts (2017)4 Marie 
Darrieussecq paints a dystopian vision of a society where 
techno- capitalism has led to the robotization of all spheres of life, 
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to the forest from where they plan attacks on clone factories.  
As an offline world, the woods have become a symbol for pri-
mordial nature, somewhere mankind should return to. They are 
portrayed as the last place not touched by hyperconnectivity and 
therefore a good place to hide from drones and other surveillance 
technology.
Information	Overload
The discourse of “information overload” occurs prominently in 
crisis diagnoses that call for disconnection. The term was coined in 
Alvin Toffler’s popular scientific book Future Shock (1970). In 1965 
Toffler had already stated that individuals are subject “to too much 
change in too short a time” (1970, 1; cited after Toffler 1965). Refer-
ring to major transformations in all realms of life (e.g., industrial-
ization, new technologies, dissolution of classic family structures), 
Toffler pleads for taking the “disease of change” (1970, 1) seriously 
and offers “strategies for survival” (Toffler 1970, 369) for those who 
feel overwhelmed.
Today, the discourse of information overload does not refer to 
general societal change but rather to literally having too much 
information.5 One argument made in popular discourse in favor 
of disconnecting holds that individuals are overwhelmed by the 
constant flow of information to which they are exposed in a world 
of ubiquitous online news, social media, and commercial screens. 
In “pre- digital times,” people would apparently watch the news 
on public- service television once a day; they could trust that this 
newscast contained everything important that they needed to 
know and that public- service broadcasting was a reliable source. 
The same held true for the radio and for “serious” daily or weekly 
newspapers. In recent years, however, the number of news sources 
has multiplied. Aside from the sheer volume of news to which 
people are now exposed, one no longer knows which news sources 
can be trusted.
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“echo chambers” and “filter bubbles” have emerged on Facebook, 
where users receive targeted information which only confirms their 
already existent attitudes. They stress that the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, which uncovered that Donald Trump and his team 
manipulated the 2016 electoral campaign by harvesting millions of 
Facebook profiles, led to great uncertainty concerning the reliability 
of news in general.
Like grocery stores, streaming services like Netflix and Spotify 
now demand that their users choose from an immense range of 
products, and what psychologists call the “freedom” or “burden 
of choice” is commonly seen as an overwhelming task. There is 
an interesting ambiguity in this particular information overload 
discourse. On the one hand, digital media seems like liberation: 
consumers are no longer tied to preselected broadcast programs 
and can actively decide what they want to watch, listen to, or  
read. On the other hand, the immense amount of options leads  
to exhaustion. Some people thus feel so overloaded with infor-
mation that they decide to stop checking the news altogether. 
For them, this renunciation feels like the only way to regain their 
agency.
Internet Addiction
Like the discourse of information overload, the discourse of “inter-
net addiction” is often used to argue for disconnection. In psychol-
ogy, internet addiction emerged as a new nonchemical behavioral 
addiction (Marks 1990) in the 1990s, asserting that even though 
the internet is not a chemical drug, people show similar reactions 
to it. Psychologist Kimberly Young (1998) conducted a survey of 
internet addiction and then published a book on the phenomenon. 
It provides accounts of people who neglect their spouses and even 
forget to pick up their children because they are so consumed by 
chat rooms. In widespread reports about cases of online shopping 
addiction, online sex addiction, and online games addiction, one 
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by faster than time spent offline.
Today, there are discussions of a new sub- syndrome of internet 
addiction: smartphone addiction. The slick way in which people 
unlock their phones in every spare second is reminiscent of the 
behavior of chain smokers who have perfected the art of efficiently 
lighting their cigarettes. Furthermore, there have been diagnoses of 
conditions like “WhatsAppitis,” a specific form of “Repetitive- Strain- 
Injury- Syndrome” with symptoms including pain in one’s thumbs 
and wrists caused by phone overuse. Another recent diagnosis is 
the “wired and tired” syndrome, also known as “adrenal fatigue.” As 
the word “wired” suggests, it describes a state of general exhaus-
tion caused by the stress of making connections and spending 
too much time on screens. Nevertheless, “internet addiction” is 
not recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) (Sutton 2017).6 Rather than a medically recognized 
condition, it can be understood as an element of popular discourse 
or a rhetorical tool used in pleas for disconnection.
The fear of media addiction has long been a common topos of 
media critique. In eighteenth- century Germany, there was a partic-
ularly heated debate about “Lesesucht” (reading mania) (Huyssen 
1986; Littau 2006). People feared that spending too much time 
reading novels led to severe consequences: women were accused 
of neglecting their households, children, and husbands; men of 
developing revolutionary ideas. On top of these social risks, some 
even claimed that reading too many novels could cause physical 
diseases— just as too much food upsets the stomach, so can too 
many novels upset the brain.
Jamming
Jamming a signal means not merely blocking it but overriding the 
original signal by sending out broadband noise. In general, the 
higher the electrical capacity, the greater and wider the range of 
jamming frequencies. Jammers interfere with different frequencies, 
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signals to Bluetooth and Wi- Fi (possible even with low power). 
Some jamming is obvious, especially if it is audible; other jamming 
is subtler and silent. In another form of jamming known as “spoof-
ing,” incorrect GPS signals are sent to mislead the receiver.
Originating in the military, the practice of jamming was (and partly 
still is) used to prevent the reception of foreign signals, such as BBC 
broadcasts in Nazi Germany or Western broadcasts in the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. Today, jamming used as an electronic 
counterstrategy remains a form of censorship, but it is also used to 
prevent the activation of bombs or for drone defense.
As an active disturbance of signals, jamming is illegal in most 
countries for members of the general population and is permitted 
only in official institutions such as prisons, among many other ex-
amples. Legal jammers can be found in public spaces like cinemas, 
theaters, or courts to inhibit disturbance caused by cell phone use. 
Regardless of their legal status, the open market offers a variety 
of jamming devices for everyday use, providing users with tools to 
prevent their car keys from being hacked, keep their credit cards 
safe, or even prevent a speed camera from triggering.
Besides radio jamming, “culture jamming” is used to describe an 
artistic performance that aims to subvert dominant representation-
al norms. One widespread practice, known as detournement, is to 
alter advertisements to present a general critique of consumerism. 
Feminist artists like The Guerilla Girls also used it to criticize sexism 
in pop culture and the art world in general (Kuni 2012).
No Phones Allowed
Even if you manage to get into Berghain, Berlin’s famously exclu-
sive techno club, your phone’s camera lenses will be covered with 
stickers. The photo ban, which can increasingly be found in other 
techno clubs, symbolizes the respect of personal boundaries as 
part of the emerging culture of “no phones allowed.” It also ensures 
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builds on the tradition of sex- positivity in techno culture but also 
struggles to deal with its rapid popularity. With their roots in sub-
cultural movements (D’Andrea 2007; St. John 2009), some techno 
and rave clubs, though having long arrived in the mainstream, 
still try to raise awareness about personal boundaries. Combined 
with the idea of enhancement in techno dance, enforcing a photo 
ban is not always an easy task. Although it mainly relies on the 
self- control and understanding of the guests, the club itself needs 
to organize the covering of the cameras and the communication of 
this rule.
While clubs enforcing a photo ban can reinforce their mythical 
image by not showing pictures of their interior, their guests can 
easily engage in subversive acts, such as secretly taking pictures in 
the toilets and putting them on Instagram. At the same time, the 
club’s lens- covering stickers have become a symbol of belonging 
to a particular scene. After the party, people leave the stickers 
on their phones so that everybody can see where they spent the 
weekend. In this way, they become part of an imaginary collective 
of ravers who refuse to take pictures.
Clubs are not the only spaces where phones are not allowed. Other 
examples of phone bans are to be found in schools, courtrooms, 
during airplane take- offs and landings, and in some countries even 
in theaters and cinemas, to mention only some examples.
Spaces of disconnectivity are deeply embedded in power structures 
and hierarchies, as this example of their exclusivity shows. None-
theless, they still contain the potential to create spaces of possi-
bility, in which different desires can be acted out. In his preface to 
The Order of Things, Michel Foucault sketches out a new form of 
space as an unstable field within an otherwise finite distribution. In 
contrast to “utopias,” “heterotopias” are located in different places, 
from where “they secretly undermine language” by forbidding 
common descriptions (Foucault 1994, xviii). For Foucault, the 
creation of a coherent space, as a search for a common tableau, is 
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an area that deviates from order while at the same time indicating 
that there can be other orders; as an order in itself that at the 
same time represents the critique of the other. If unplugged spaces 
are seen as heterotopias, then they cannot simply be merged into 
connectivity, but are produced as liminal spaces of critique.
Offline
For analog nostalgists, being offline has great value. In a world 
where everything seems to be online, many feel that they can only 
lead an “authentic” life offline. The curation of everyday lives on 
social media, exemplified by the editing of pictures using filters on 
Instragam, leads to a certain distrust: If people’s internet presence 
is assumed to be fake, then analog nostalgists feel that only when 
they meet people offline or “in real life” (irl) can they get to know 
their true, authentic selves. Face- to- face communication is taken 
to be more authentic than chatting via text messages, because 
offline conversations can be accompanied by blushing, stuttering, 
and other social cues that exceed the expressive capacity of emoji. 
These reactions, along with the mimicry of one’s counterpart, is 
said to allow for authentic communication.
The word “offline” is especially popular in Germany in the context 
of imaginaries of digital disconnection. The teenage novel The  
Other Side of Lost by Jessi Kirby (2018) has been translated into 
German as Offline ist es nass, wenn’s regnet (2019), meaning “offline 
it is wet when it’s raining.” But “offline” does not have exclusively 
positive connotations: the German psycho- thriller Offline (2019)  
by Arno Strobel follows a group of people who go on a digital  
detox trip to the mountains, which becomes a horror trip when  
one of the participants disappears and is then found severely 
abused. Being offline represents the downfall of the novel’s 
protagonists.
On Instagram, there are currently around 481,000 posts tagged 
#offline.7 The images gathered under this hashtag include pictures 
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are going offline for a certain period of time, but also of people 
eating. There are even selfies of people in #offline elevators. Thus, 
the hashtag seems to be used for any kind of activity that doesn’t 
take place directly in front of a computer— it takes on the form of 
an empty signifier whose total emptiness simultaneously means 
total abundance (Laclau 2007).
Perturbation
When riding public transportation, one sometimes doubts the di-
agnosis of “ubiquitous connectivity.” Even on Germany’s celebrated 
national railroad system, phone calls are interrupted as soon as  
the train enters a tunnel (and sometimes without any recognizable 
reason at all). On Germany’s high- speed train, the Intercity- 
Express’s (ICE), the on- board Wi- Fi service is so unreliable that 
sending an e- mail becomes a real challenge. These experiences 
cannot be described as moments of disconnectivity; they are mo-
ments of perturbation.
Whereas “perturbation” describes some kind of unintended 
mistake— a failure, malfunction, or shortcoming— “disconnection” 
always involves intentional practices, which are not deficient but 
distinct. In contrast to perturbation, disconnectivity needs to be 
actively produced. Passing a dead zone in a train and becoming 
annoyed at a poor signal is different than deliberately visiting 
dead zones for a digital detox vacation. Whereas the former 
example describes a case of perturbation, the latter describes a 
case of disconnection. Still, this distinction between perturbation 
and disconnection should not reproduce the dualism between 
technological determinism on the one hand and the idea of the 
autonomous human on the other.
Moments of perturbation do not necessarily mean being com-
pletely at the mercy of (malfunctioning) technology. Neither do 
moments of disconnection require the human subject to regain 
agency. Following this logic would amount to agreeing with 
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that human beings are fundamentally threatened by technology. 
Rather, disconnection can be understood as a heterogenous mate-
rial process that involves humans and technological infrastructures 
as well as imaginaries.
Renunciation
It has become almost impossible to renounce digital media com-
pletely. It is hard to imagine someone pursuing a career without 
an e- mail address. University students who do not own laptops will 
not be able to write and hand in much of their coursework.8 And 
ironically, even digital detox trips have to be booked online. Yet 
there are still people who are not on social media and who do not 
use smartphones. Some of them do not have to “renounce” digital 
media because they have never used it in the first place; others 
were once keen internet enthusiasts who changed their minds. 
In one of many examples of repentance among former social 
media enthusiasts, Chamath Palihapitiya, a senior executive at 
Facebook from 2007 to 2011, said that he now feels “tremendous 
guilt” about having helped to build up the company. He states that 
Facebook is “ripping apart the social fabric of how society works” by 
its “short- term, dopamine- driven feedback loops.” In a talk at the 
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Palihapitiya recommends 
that people take a “hard break” from social media (Vincent 2017). 
Karppi and Nieborg (2020) identify these confessions as “corporate 
abdication.” The confessions of former Facebook employees “are 
not so much truths about these technologies and how the platform 
actually functions, but rather efforts to construct and shape our 
vision of platform power by mapping and highlighting particular 
relations instead of others” (Karppi and Nieborg 2020, 5).
There is a story about Bay Area employees who work in Silicon 
Valley but send their children to Waldorf schools because they 
are free of mobile phones (Nathani 2018). The fact that the very 
people who warn against hyperconnectivity and recommend 
disconnection are internet and technology experts might make 
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know more about the addictive nature of the technology that they, 
after all, developed themselves. One of the most prominent and 
influential critics of social media is computer scientist Jaron Lanier, 
one of the developers of virtual reality. Cal Newport, author of 
Digital Minimalism, is also a professor of computer science. The 
statements of experts like these can be understood as one specific 
discourse of disconnection among others, including those of media 
scholars, psychologists, and analog nostalgists. By using rhetorical 
devices related to “internet addiction” and “saving the children,” 
these experts construct one specific perspective on social media.
Right to Disconnect
The “right to disconnect” is intended to protect employees from con-
stant availability by assuring them that they do not have to check 
their e- mails or answer phone calls during nonworking hours. “Le 
droit à la déconnexion,” as this right is called in the country where 
it originated, is a response to the dissolving of boundaries between 
work time and free time. The right to disconnect emerged in France 
in 2001 as a means of assuring employees they are not obliged to 
work at home or to take home their files and office equipment. With 
the advent of smartphones, the need for this right became even 
more pressing. In 2016, the “El Khomri Law” (named after France’s 
then- current Minister of Labor) was passed by the national govern-
ment, offering French employees the right to disconnect from work 
calls and e- mails during nonworking hours (Collins et al. 2019). A 
paragraph was added to the law that specified how to proceed if an 
employer fails to respect the employee’s right to personal and fam-
ily time (e.g., implementing training and awareness- raising activities 
regarding the reasonable use of digital tools) (Legifrance 2016). The 
right took legal effect on January 1, 2017.
In recent years, other countries, including the Philippines, Italy, 
Spain, and Canada, have implemented similar rights. In addition 
to legal enforcement, some companies have introduced policies 
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after a certain time of day. Pepita Hesselberth (2018) focuses on 
the debate around the right to disconnect in order to study the par-
adox of dis/connectivity. She points out that the above- mentioned 
amendments made to the “El Khomri Law” risk having the opposite 
effect of what they aim to achieve. In declaring that the “penalty” 
imposed on the employer when violating the employee’s right to 
disconnect consists in implementing awareness training, the law 
becomes neither mandatory nor binding. Thus, the traditional 
separation between work time and free time is not necessarily 
retained; the risk is that every hour of the employee’s life becomes 
available for the employer to access. Rather than concluding that 
there is “no outside” to the “culture of connectivity” (van Dijck 
2013), Hesselbert argues, similarly to Tero Karppi (2018), that 
disconnectivity simultaneously limits and constitutes connectivity; 
therein lies the paradox of dis/connectivity.
Shield Wear
Shield wear refers to clothes and jewelry made of material that 
blocks radio waves and wireless signals, or makes one invisible to 
surveillance drones and face- recognition cameras. It might also 
protect those who believe in the harmfulness of electromagnetic 
radiation. Artists like Nicole Scheller (interviewed in this book), 
Adam Harvey, and Ewa Nowak make it their project to create this 
kind of privacy fashion. They experiment with materials and forms 
so as not only to make political statements but to make them 
fashionable. Some of these clothes are built after the Faraday cage 
principle, so that the person wearing the garment is shielded from 
an electromagnetic field. Others have a built- in reflection shield 
that blinds cameras (also by using light) and is capable of thermal 
reflection, so that the wearer is not visible on infrared cameras. In 
addition to such blocking materials, another way of avoiding one’s 
biological data being analyzed is to change the body’s shape and 
camouflage the face through distorted shapes and patterns and 
unnatural proportions of masks, paint, or jewelry.
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sell shield wear for formal use. The Dutch company Holland Shield-
ing Systems BV offers a collection of materials that protect the 
body from electromagnetic fields. One item is the shielded burka, 
advertised on the company’s website as follows: “Shielding your 
head just got easier. Slip this sheer and roomy burka over your 
head and it will provide 99.7% shielding across the frequency range 
10 MHz— 3 GHz and > 94% at 5.6 GHz. These frequencies include 
Wi- Fi, cordless phones, phone masts, mobile phones, and even TV 
and radio broadcasts. . . . Quick to put on, easy to take off. One 
size fits all” (Holland Shielding Systems BV 2020). Considering the 
debate around banning face veils in various European countries 
and the oppressive character ascribed to burkas for some Islamic 
women who wear them, this lighthearted advertisement appears 
quite odd. One wonders if the company accidentally adopted 
an inappropriate tone or if it can be understood as a deliberate 
revaluation of the burka: instead of being compulsory, the shielded 
burka is now easy to put on and remove. It is not designed for 
women alone but according to the principles of one- size- fits- all. Its 
purpose is not to protect women from the male gaze or to protect 
men from the sight of female bodies but to protect everyone from 
electromagnetic fields. The depicted item (https://hollandshielding 
.com/Shielded-burka?_ga=2.225674202.1981716146.1605613357 
-2099775437.1605613357) is actually a niqaab rather than a 
burka— the latter covers not only the head but the whole body, 
with only a mesh screen in front of the eyes. Thus, shield wear 
forms part of a wider debate around concealment practices; this 
debate covers issues related to emancipatory practices as well as 
commercialization.
Social Distancing
It is still too early to estimate the long- term effects of the current 
Covid- 19 pandemic on disconnection discourses and the field of 
disconnection studies (and there are, of course, much more press-
ing issues at the moment). However, it is already clear that a fun-
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“connectedness”9 celebrated by analog nostalgists and proponents 
of digital detox cannot currently be enjoyed, since people are asked 
(or in some countries obliged) to stay at home. The Digital Detox® 
website announces that the “May 2020 Camp is Cancelled Due 
to COVID- 19 Travel Concerns” (Digital Detox 2020). On Instagram 
the hashtags #stayhome, #stayathome, or, more aggressively, 
#staythefuckhome enjoy great popularity. To slow down the dis-
semination of the virus, we need to practice “social distancing.”
The plea for social distancing is very different from the plea for 
digital detox. Whereas discourses arguing for digital detox are likely 
to favor human encounters but fear that digital technologies pose 
a threat to “real” connections, in times of social distancing commu-
nication technologies are the only way to stay in touch with friends, 
family members, and colleagues. Will the internet’s reputation, 
even among analog nostalgists, benefit from the coronavirus crisis?
To avoid connotations of isolation, the World Health Organization 
has started to use the term “physical distancing,” which was 
proposed by Daniel Aldrich, a U.S. professor of political science 
and public policy (Gale 2020). In Germany, there is also the notion 
of “Kontaktverbot” (usually meaning a “restraining order,” albeit 
the literal translation is “prohibition of contact”). When googling 
the term, one can read headlines concerning numerous breaches 
of the “Kontaktverbot” that were punished by the police. Thus, 
new (moralizing) discourses around how to behave have emerged 
in light of the crisis; their semantics differ greatly across contexts 
and countries.
Aside from this possible revaluation of the internet in the context 
of cultural- critical discourses on digital technologies, along with the 
emergence of new discourses of disconnection, the current situa-
tion sheds light on the societal importance of distance. As early as 
1903, Georg Simmel (1950) pointed to the fact that social distancing 
is a key coping mechanism for people living in big cities.10 Only by 
keeping fellow urbanites and the constant flow of impressions at 
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overwhelmed. Whereas recent decades were marked by a “fetish 
of connectivity” (Pedersen 2013, quoted by Stäheli at the start of 
chapter 1 of this volume), the current crisis highlights the risks and 
limits of connectivity. It is to be expected that our current state of 
social distancing will affect the way we conceive of society as such. 
Approaches that manage to conceptualize moments of disconnec-
tivity and distance will therefore only be in greater demand.
Unfollowing
Ubiquitous connectivity affects not only the way we date (e.g., using 
apps like Grindr or Tinder) but also the way we break up (Gershon 
2012). Urs Stäheli (2013) refers to an interesting German blog entry 
written in 2012 under the heading “Die emotionale Entnetzung— 
Trennung in Zeiten des Internets” (Undoing networks in emo-
tional terms: Separation in the internet age). In the post, blogger 
FrolleinSocial (2012) describes the cumbersome process of separat-
ing from her ex- boyfriend. Formerly, the only “account” that need-
ed to be deleted was the ex- partner’s name on the shared doorbell 
nameplate. Information relating to the ex- partner’s life could be 
provided by mutual friends (ideally, upon request only). Nowadays, 
the process of separation is much more laborious. Precautions 
must actively be taken if one is not to be permanently inundated 
with details about the ex- partner’s life. There are several platforms 
(e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter) on which FrolleinSocial needs to 
actively block her ex- boyfriend’s account. A more radical approach 
is to “unfriend” (Facebook) or “unfollow” (Instagram and Twitter) 
him. According to Stäheli (2013, 4), this blog entry illustrates how 
the cutting of ties is a cumbersome process that becomes even 
more tedious in the internet age, as connections proliferate to an 
unprecedented degree.
“Unfollow” is also the name of an app and the title of a recently 
published German bestselling book (Schink 2020). The app serves 
to track people who have unfollowed you on Instagram (following 
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them then unfollow you in order to get more followers of their 
own— this seems to be a socially undesirable yet recurrent phe-
nomenon on Instagram). The book, on the other hand, is a furious 
critique of Instagram (its subtitle is Wie Instagram unser Leben 
zerstört, or “How Instagram is destroying our lives”). Even though 
the app and the book share the same title, they have opposite 
agendas, both of which are characteristic of current discourses 
on (dis)connectivity. Whereas the app represents the desire to 
enhance one’s popularity in terms of the number of Instagram 
followers and mobilizes the fear of losing these followers, the  
book questions the overall logic of following and advocates 
unfollowing.
Unfriending
“Unfriending” (John and Dvir- Gvirsman 2015; Schwarz and Shani 
2016; Sibona and Walzak 2011; John and Gal 2018) is an activity 
exclusively associated with Facebook, insofar as the people users 
are connected with are not called “friends” but “followers” on 
other social media platforms like Instagram and Twitter. Nicholas 
A. John and Noam Gal argue that Facebook is “by far the most 
popular social media platform in Israel” (2018, 2971). Based on 
interviews with Jewish Israeli Facebook users, John and Gal explore 
the political connotations of unfriending someone on Facebook 
during the Israel– Gaza conflict of 2014. According to John and 
Gal, unfriending is a “form of [online] boundary management for 
the self in conditions of networked sociality” (2971). The authors 
develop the “productive . . . oxymoron” of the “personal public 
sphere” (2971) as a means of theorizing the communicative space 
for political discussion emerging on social networking sites. In 
their research, John and Gal notice a certain dissonance: to achieve 
the desired effect (i.e., removing certain political posts from their 
newsfeeds), their interviewees could simply have hidden unwant-
ed posts of their Facebook friends instead of unfriending them 
altogether. Acknowledging this dissonance, John and Gal conclude 
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over the personal public sphere” (2982), and argue further that “the 
issue of with whom I am connected” (2973) is an important aspect 
of identity- building.
Comparing their findings to the act of “unfollowing” points to a 
qualitative difference between the two modes of undoing online 
ties. Do social relations on Facebook tend to follow a pattern 
of constant reciprocity and mutual identification while ties on 
Instagram take a more ephemeral shape?
Unplugging
“Unplugging,” as a practice of disconnection, means actively 
withdrawing— usually only temporarily— from the state of being 
digitally connected. The decision to “opt out” is often accompanied 
by events that celebrate the peculiarity of the act itself: smiling, 
happy people hold signs saying “I unplug to . . . reconnect, jam, 
love, cherish the moment, go party, sleep all day” and so on.
Starting in 2010, the National Day of Unplugging in the United 
States has called the first Friday in every March for “a 24- hour 
respite from technology” (National Day of Unplugging). Associated 
with the Jewish sabbath tradition, this initiative from a nonprofit 
Jewish organization known as “Reboot” wrote a corresponding 
“Sabbath Manifesto” for the digital world. Combining religious 
rules with the slow movement, it is based on ten main principles: 
“avoid technology; connect with loved ones; nurture your health; 
get outside; avoid commerce; light candles; drink wine; eat bread; 
find silence; give back” (Sabbath Manifesto). Rooted in the religious 
rules of the Sabbath (which does not allow Jewish people to use 
electrical devices), the discussion around temporary digital absti-
nence becomes detached from its religious origins and develops 
into a conception of self- care in general.
In addition to foregoing use of technological devices, participants in 
National Day of Unplugging can further engage by hosting events 
109such as unplugged bike rides or phone- free community dinners. 
There is even a program for unplugging with children (because 
“they are born unplugged”), providing the “unplugger” with boxes 
that contain a “cell phone sleeping bag,” ideas for board games, 
and cooking recipes.
When used in the field of education, unplugging becomes a long- 
term strategy, evident in the concept of “unplugged classrooms,” 
whereby phones are banned from schools. Aside from institutional 
unplugging, as in schools and courtrooms, most unplugged spaces 
are hidden or not easy to find. With a little effort, however, a broad 
range of these spaces can be revealed, including phone- free clubs, 
coffee shops, and fancy restaurants where one is not allowed to 
use one’s phone. The process of becoming unplugged requires a 
highly complex organizational structure and the help of technolo-
gies, practices, and infrastructures.
Notes
We would like to thank Timon Beyes, Tero Karppi, and Urs Stäheli for their help 
with developing this glossary. Further, we thank Erik Born and Sean Shields for 
their copyediting work and their helpful comments as well as Finn Brunton and 
Melissa Gregg for their substantial reviews.
 1 See Sterne 2016 for a critique of this simplified notion of analog media.
 2 See Sutton 2017 as well as Stäheli and Stoltenberg 2020 for research on this 
particular camp.
 3 As of today (March 30, 2020) the website has disappeared. Seppukoo can only 
be accessed via http://www.seppukoo.com/how-it-works.
 4 English title: Our Life in the Forest.
 5 See Mark Andrejevic’s book Infoglut (2013).
 6 Nick Seaver (2019) suggests using anthropological theories about trapping 
when thinking about algorithmic recommender systems. He argues that the 
notion of the trap offers an alternative to the moralizing framings of internet 
addiction.
 7 See Jorge 2019, whose discourse analysis of temporary disconnection on Insta-
gram includes the hashtag #offline.
 8 The questions of unequal access to digital technologies are discussed in de-
bates on the “digital divide”; see, among others, Norris 2001.
 9 José van Dijck (2013) distinguishes between “connectedness” and “connectivity.” 
Whereas the latter describes connections commodified by social- networking 
110 companies, the former refers to the “genuine” human desire to connect with 
one another.
10 See Urs Stäheli’s contribution in this volume as well as Stäheli 2018.
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